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ABSTRACT
CHRISTOPHER J. CRONIN: Insurance-Induced Moral Hazard: A Dynamic Model of
Within-Year Medical Care Decision Making Under Uncertainty.
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie)
Insurance-induced moral hazard may lead individuals to overconsume medical care. Many
studies estimate this overconsumption using models that aggregate medical care decisions up
to the annual level. Using employer-employee matched data from the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS), I estimate the effect of moral hazard on medical care expenditure us-
ing a dynamic model of within-year medical care consumption that allows for endogenous
health transitions, variation in medical care prices, and individual uncertainty within a health
insurance year. I then calculate moral hazard effects under a second set of conditions that are
consistent with the assumptions of most annual decision-making models. The within-year
decision-making model produces a moral hazard effect that is 24% larger than the alternative
model. I also provide evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard effects, particularly between
insured and uninsured individuals, and discuss related policy implications. The dissertation
concludes with a counterfactual policy simulation that implements the individual mandate
provision of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. I find that full imple-
mentation of the individual mandate decreases the percentage of uninsured individuals in the
population being analyzed from 11.8% to 6.0% and increases average medical care expendi-
ture 77% among the newly insured.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Economic theory suggests that health insurance may increase medical care consumption
above the socially optimal level (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968). The incentives that elicit this
increase in consumption are often referred to as moral hazard (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).1
Empirical studies tend to estimate moral hazard effects using models that aggregate med-
ical care decisions up to the annual level. In this dissertation, I study insurance-induced
moral hazard using a dynamic stochastic model of within-year medical care consumption
decisions. The within-year decision-making model more accurately captures the data gener-
ating process by relaxing several assumptions made frequently in the literature. Specifically,
the model allows for endogenous health transitions, variation in medical care prices, and in-
dividual uncertainty within a health insurance year. The research contributes to the literature
in two ways. First, I show that the within-year decision-making model produces a moral
hazard effect that is 24% larger than an alternative model that imposes the more restrictive
assumptions of a typical annual expenditure model.2 Second, I provide evidence of heteroge-
neous moral hazard effects, particularly between insured and uninsured individuals. I explain
why each of these findings is consistent with economic theory and show how differences in
estimated moral hazard effects can lead to large differences in predicted policy outcomes. I
also conduct a series of counterfactual policy simulations to study the potential effects of the
individual insurance mandate provision of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care
1The term moral hazard is used rather loosely in the health economics literature. I describe moral hazard as
the incentives associated with insurance possession that lead to changes in individual behavior. I focus on one
effect of moral hazard, which is the effect that health insurance possession has on medical care consumption. I
discuss the welfare implications of this additional consumption in Appendix D.
2The moral hazard effect is measured as the percentage increase in mean annual medical care expenditure
that is caused by insurance acquisition. A more detailed description of this calculation is given in Section 6.3.
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Act (ACA).
The within-year decision-making model is motivated by theoretical (Grossman 1972;
Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps 1977) and empirical (Gilleskie 1998; Cardon and Hendel
2001; Khwaja 2001, 2010; Blau and Gilleskie 2008) models of health production and medical
care demand. An individual’s optimization problem consists of an annual health insurance de-
cision, followed by a sequence of monthly medical care consumption decisions made over the
course of a health insurance year. I model monthly medical care decisions to allow the unique
benefits and costs associated with the timing of unexpected illness and potential medical care
consumption to impact behavior within the model. Within each month, a forward-looking
individual responds to an endogenous stochastic health event by consuming units of medi-
cal care. The (anticipated) primary benefit of medical care consumption is improved future
health. The (anticipated) primary cost is financial (i.e., a decrease in the current consump-
tion of non-medical goods).3 When health insurance has dynamic cost-sharing features (i.e.,
deductible and stop loss), an additional benefit of current medical care consumption is the
reduced cost of future care once accumulated expenditure crosses a threshold.4 The model
also allows a direct contemporaneous utility benefit or cost of medical care consumption that
is independent of the productive and financial effects.
An individual faces uncertainty along multiple dimensions of the optimization problem.
Prior to both an annual health insurance decision and each monthly medical care decision, an
individual is uncertain of his future health outcomes, medical care consumption, and medical
care prices. Furthermore, I assume that prior to medical care consumption an individual
knows the conditional distributions from which medical care prices are drawn, but does not
3I qualify anticipated benefits and costs because the estimated model parameters determine both the sign and
magnitude of medical care productivity (in producing positive health outcomes) and the disutility from reduced
consumption of non-medical goods. I expect to find that medical care is productive, a reduction in non-medical
consumption yields disutility, and that each plays a principle role in the medical care decision-making process.
4A deductible is a fixed amount of accumulated medical care expenditure that must be reached (within an
insurance year) before the insurer covers any part of total medical care costs. A stop loss is an accumulated
out-of-pocket expenditure threshold at which an individual’s share of the total cost of any additional medical
care consumed during that insurance year is zero.
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know the exact prices he will be charged for different types of care.5 Though it is typically
assumed that prices are known prior to consumption, there are several reasons why price
uncertainty is a more realistic assumption. First, an individual rarely knows a physician’s
diagnosis and recommended treatment prior to an office or hospital visit. Second, in the U.S.,
medical care providers do not display a menu of prices and there is evidence of wide price
variation in local medical care markets. Each of these market characteristics make it difficult
for an individual to know exactly how much he will be charged for care.
The within-year decision-making model, which is characterized by these important mar-
ket features, also has several empirical advantages. First, the model has the ability to capture
patterns in the data that are explained by within-year behavior. For example, in the estima-
tion sample, average monthly medical care expenditure is $127.60 higher in months where an
individual has an acute illness. This spending gap exists even when conditioning on chronic
illness entering the year: expenditure is $119.78 higher in acute illness months for those with-
out a chronic illness and $140.30 higher for those with a chronic illness.6 This behavior can
be explained by the within-year decision-making model if medical care decreases the likeli-
hood of having an acute illness and has a financial cost. Second, the assumptions imposed
on the within-year decision-making model may impact the estimated effect of moral hazard.
For example, the model allows medical care consumption to affect health over the course of
a health insurance year (i.e., within-year health transitions are treated as endogenous). Most
models of medical care demand either do not model health at all (implicitly assuming that
health transitions are exogenously determined) or model annual health outcomes. Allowing
for endogenous health transitions within an insurance year impacts the estimated effect of
moral hazard if the insured consume more medical care but then find themselves in better
health, decreasing the need for medical care consumption in the future.
5I use the terms price and total cost, interchangeably, to describe the total amount billed for a unit of medical
care. The out-of-pocket cost to an individual is often less than the price billed due to insurance cost-sharing.
The difference between medical care prices and costs paid out-of-pocket is discussed further in Section 3.4.
6Throughout the dissertation, all dollar amounts are reported in 1996 dollars, unless stated otherwise.
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I estimate the model parameters via maximum likelihood using employer-employee match
data from the 1996-1999 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). I use simulation tech-
niques to examine model fit and to calculate the effect of moral hazard on medical care expen-
diture. I conduct a set of counterfactual simulations to study how different assumptions im-
posed on a within-year decision-making model lead to different moral hazard effects. Specif-
ically, I examine how the estimated effect of moral hazard responds to the assumption that
health transitions are exogenously determined (assumption 1), that medical care prices are
known prior to consumption (assumption 2), and that all health and price shocks are known
at the beginning of the year (assumption 3). The main counterfactual imposes assumptions
1, 2, and 3, as these assumptions are consistent with those made implicitly in most annual
expenditure models, such as Cardon and Hendel (2001), Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf,
and Cullen (2013), and Kowalski (2013).7
Health insurance is predicted to increase mean annual medical care expenditure by 92%
using the (preferred) within-year decision-making model and 74% when assumptions 1, 2,
and 3 are imposed. The counterfactual estimate compares favorably with estimates produced
by several annual expenditure models in the literature. Ultimately, the presence of health and
price uncertainty at the time of medical care consumption in the preferred model decreases
the expected value of medical care. The larger moral hazard effect produced by the within-
year model is driven by exceptionally low medical care consumption when uninsured, as risk
averse individuals who face uncertainty are exposed to significant risk in consumption.
I find heterogeneous moral hazard effects across the population. The 92% increase in
mean annual medical care expenditure that results from insurance acquisition is driven by
individuals with exceptionally large increases in expenditure. If the top 1% of additional
spenders are dropped, then the increase in mean expenditure due to insurance is reduced to
7Bajari, Hong, Khwaja, and Marsh (2013) is similar but does allow for some uncertainty at the time of
medical care decision making. The authors assume that an individual selects his total annual medical care
expenditure while knowing only the distribution of the proportion of that expenditure he must pay out-of-pocket.
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65%. Furthermore, 44% of the population does not increase their expenditure at all when they
become insured. I also find significant differences in how insured and uninsured individuals
respond to coverage. When individuals are moved from an uninsured state to their optimal
plan, mean annual medical care expenditure in the insured population increases by 96%;
however, mean annual medical care expenditure in the uninsured population increases by
only 55%. In Section 6.3.2, I discuss the factors that drive these differences and explore the
policy implications of the differential response to coverage between these two groups.
The dissertation concludes with a counterfactual exercise that examines the behavioral
response to an individual insurance mandate that is consistent with the ACA.8 When facing a
penalty of $695 (in 2016 dollars) or 2.5% of income (whichever is larger) for failing to carry
health insurance coverage, the proportion of the population being analyzed that chooses to
be uninsured decreases from 11.8% to 6.0%. Of the previously uninsured population, mean
annual medical care expenditure for the newly insured increases by 77% (moral hazard ef-
fect), while expenditure for those remaining uninsured falls by 2.4% (income/penalty effect).
Given that the full implementation penalty does not elicit universal coverage, I also examine
the welfare implications of forced insurance take-up. Holding insurance premiums and med-
ical care prices fixed, I find that among uninsured individuals the average expected welfare
loss from forced take-up is $1608 (2016 dollars).9
The following section provides motivation for this research and discusses some of the
previous literature. Section 3 details the theoretical model of insurance and within-year med-
ical care demand. Section 4 describes the data and the sample used in estimation. Section 5
details the estimation procedure and discusses identification. Sections 6 presents parameter
estimates, model fit, and counterfactual simulations. Section 7 concludes.
8This counterfactual implements the individual mandate provision of the ACA only. There are many other
regulations that the ACA imposes upon the marketplace that are not considered. Furthermore, the empirical anal-
ysis conducted in this research focuses on a population of individuals who are unmarried, childless, employed,
between the ages of 19 and 64, and have the ability to purchase health insurance through their employers.
9The average expected welfare loss is measured as the average penalty that would make an uninsured individ-
ual indifferent between remaining uninsured and paying the penalty or being insured and paying the premium.
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2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
Health insurance generates welfare by protecting risk averse individuals from medical ex-
penses associated with unforeseen health shocks (Arrow 1963). However, the welfare gains
from risk protection are potentially mitigated by changes in individual behavior after becom-
ing insured. For example, insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of medical care, which
can lead to excess consumption when sick, known as ex-post moral hazard (Pauly 1968).
Also, a reduction in the expected cost of curative medical care can reduce participation in
healthy behaviors (e.g., preventative medical care, diet, exercise, etc.) leading to worse health
outcomes and potentially greater medical care consumption in the future, known as ex-ante
moral hazard (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).10 Each of these forces drives insured individuals
to consume medical care past the socially optimal level, generating a welfare loss.11 There-
fore, efficient health insurance plan design requires an understanding of how health insurance
leads to changes in individual medical care consumption behavior.
10In the empirical health economics literature, moral hazard normally refers only to ex-post moral hazard
(some exceptions are Dave and Kaestner (2009) and Kelly and Markowitz (2009)). Ex-ante moral hazard is
difficult to study for two reasons. First, ex-ante moral hazard involves changes in many non-medical behaviors
(i.e., exercise, diet, smoking, etc.). Second, ex-ante moral hazard results from poor health behaviors that lead to
worse health outcomes, meaning endogenous health transitions must be modeled. The model presented in this
research allows for ex-post moral hazard and limits the effect of ex-ante moral hazard to changes in medical
care consumption. That is, an individual in the model may respond to health insurance coverage by consuming
medical care less frequently, which may lead to poor health outcomes and greater medical care consumption in
the future. However, I do not model non-medical behavioral responses to insurance acquisition.
11It is assumed here that the level of medical care consumption when uninsured is socially optimal. If medical
care prices are non-competitive or if their are externalities in medical care consumption (e.g., the reduction of
communicative diseases), then consumption when uninsured may not be efficient. Even if the level of consump-
tion when uninsured is socially optimal, it is not the case that the full increase in medical care consumption
due to insurance acquisition is welfare reducing. As is covered extensively by Nyman (1999a,b,c), the addi-
tional medical care consumption that is caused by insurance possession results from both lower out-of-pocket
medical care costs and an income transfer from the well to the sick, the latter of which is welfare neutral. The
main moral hazard effect discussed in this research includes the income effect, because there are no welfare
calculations presented at this time.
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Determining how medical care consumption and welfare are affected by health insurance
has been a central focus of empirical health insurance and medical care research over the past
30 years. The primary challenge in estimating, for instance, the percentage increase in mean
annual medical care expenditure that is caused by health insurance possession (i.e., a measure
of the effect of moral hazard) is the endogenous selection of health insurance. Those who
expect to consume more medical care during a health insurance year select generous health
insurance coverage; this is known as adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). Both moral hazard and
adverse selection lead to a positive correlation between observed medical care expenditure
and insurance possession/generosity; however, the extent to which this correlation is driven
by moral hazard or adverse selection has important policy implications.12
One method that has been used to control for endogenous insurance selection, so that
moral hazard effects can be identified, is a randomized experiment. A well known exam-
ple is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The 1971 RAND HIE was a multi-
year, $295 million (in 2011 dollars, (Greenberg and Shroder 2004)) medical care study that,
among other things, randomly distributed health insurance plans to participants in 6 U.S.
cities and recorded health and medical care consumption in the years following (for more
details, see Newhouse 1974, 1993). By randomly assigning coverage, the experiment’s de-
sign created exogenous variation in insurance holdings so that price elasticities (i.e., another
measure of the effect of moral hazard) could be estimated. A more recent example of re-
searchers using experimental data to study moral hazard is the Oregon HIE. In 2008, the
Oregon Health Authority expanded the state’s Medicaid program to 10,000 additional low-
income adults using a lottery (i.e., qualifying individuals were randomly selected and given
the ability to apply for coverage). Again, random assignment allows these researchers to
study moral hazard without concern for endogenous insurance selection. This experiment
12If moral hazard is the dominant force behind this correlation, then policy makers should encourage less risk
protection through greater cost-sharing. Requiring an individual to pay a larger share of the price of medical
care reduces his incentive to overconsume care. If adverse selection is the dominant force, then policy makers
should encourage greater risk pooling.
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is ongoing, though one year (Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse,
Allen, Baicker, and the Oregon Health Study Group 2012) and two year (Baicker, Taubman,
Allen, Bernstein, Gruber, Newhouse, Schneider, Wright, Zaslavsky, Finkelstein, and the Ore-
gon Health Study Group 2013) evaluations of the program have been published. There are
also numerous quasi-experimental studies that use econometric techniques and exogenous (or
near exogenous) shifts in insurance policy, such as Medicaid expansion (Currie and Gruber
1996; Dafny and Gruber 2005) or the Massachusetts market reforms (Miller 2012; Kolstad
and Kowalski 2012), to control for adverse selection.
While both experimental and quasi-experimental techniques have been used to success-
fully control for adverse selection so that moral hazard effects may be identified, a principle
goal in this literature is to move beyond measuring the spending response to observed plans
and/or policies.13 Recently, research efforts have focused on measuring the welfare implica-
tions of the additional spending caused by moral hazard and designing insurance plans and
insurance plan alternative sets that improve consumer welfare. In this pursuit, researchers
have turned to structural modeling.14 Importantly, structural models have allowed researchers
to both control for adverse selection in order to quantify moral hazard effects and to calcu-
late the welfare implications of these effects. Furthermore, because insurance decisions are
typically modeled and insurance cost-sharing characteristics are allowed to impact optimal
13The experimental and quasi-experimental research found in this literature has generally focused on analyz-
ing the effects of specific policies on outcomes of interest. Unfortunately, these results are difficult to generalize,
as the estimated effects are normally applicable for only a specific policy and population. Manning, Newhouse,
Duan, Keeler, and Leibowitz (1987) and Keeler and Rolph (1988) are exceptions to this rule, as they estimate
a single price/co-insurance elasticity of medical care demand that is frequently used by researchers and policy
makers to predict changes in medical care expenditure levels that would result from insurance plans and policies
not observed in the marketplace. However, as is discussed extensively in Aron-Dine, Einav, and Finkelstein
(2013), application of the single price elasticity measure requires a researcher to characterize a health insurance
plan by a single price. Because modern health insurance plans are characterized by many cost-sharing features
that change the out-of-pocket cost of medical care over the course of a health insurance year, there is no obvious
way to summarize a plan by a single price. Aron-Dine et al. (2013) conduct an empirical exercise where they
predict medical care expenditure using the single price elasticity and implement several common strategies for
determining a single price. Their results show wide variation in predicted results depending on the strategy used.
14In this context, structural modeling should be interpreted as explicitly modeling and estimating the param-
eters of an individual’s optimization problem with regard to medical care consumption. See Chiappori and
Salanie (2002) and Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) for a review of this technique.
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medical care decision making through the budget constraint, the models are well suited to
study behavioral and welfare responses to counterfactual insurance plans, insurance alterna-
tive sets, and regulatory policies.
Among the related structural models that have been designed and estimated (Cardon and
Hendel 2001; Khwaja 2001, 2010; Einav et al. 2013; Kowalski 2013; Bajari et al. 2013; Han-
del 2013), all have aggregated medical care expenditures and health outcomes up to the an-
nual level.15 Annual expenditure models have been popular, here and elsewhere in the health
economics literature, primarily due to data limitations. Annual medical care expenditure data
are accessible. Large public data sets, which contain total annual expenditure variables that
have been cleaned and are ready for immediate use, are used by many empirical researchers
and allow for nationally representative findings.16 Also, estimation of annual expenditure
models can be achieved without high frequency explanatory data, such as illness state, which
is both difficult to find and desirable when estimating a model of within-year medical care
decisions.17 My research builds on these structural annual expenditure models by allowing
for monthly medical care consumption decisions to be made over a health insurance year and
by relaxing several assumptions commonly made in annual decision-making models.18
15Khwaja (2001, 2010) aggregates to the biennial level.
16Examples are: the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS); the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS),
which has been cleaned by RAND; and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).
17Note that while insurer claims data (or claims data from a large self-insuring company, which are used
in Einav et al. 2013; Kowalski 2013; Bajari et al. 2013; and Handel 2013) allow for the observation of high-
frequency medical care consumption decisions, illness state is only observed when an individual chooses to
consume care. Therefore, endogenous health transitions cannot be modeled well using claims data.
18A few researchers have studied health insurance and/or medical care demand using within-year behavior
as an outcome. Keeler and Rolph (1988) and Keeler, Buchanan, Rolph, Hanley, and Reboussin (1988) use data
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment to examine medical care consumption during treatment episodes
in order to study the role of insurance deductibles and stop losses. Aron-Dine, Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen
(2012) use quasi-experimental data to “investigate whether individuals exhibit forward-looking behavior in their
response to the non-linear pricing common in health insurance contracts.” Ellis (1986) models demand for men-
tal health services in the first 30, 60, and 90 days of a year as a function of expected end of the year prices, while
assuming insurance coverage is determined exogenously. Gilleskie (1998) estimates a structural model of daily
medical care consumption and absenteeism during acute illness episodes, also assuming insurance coverage is
determined exogenously. Despite the smaller units of behavior, these authors can separately identify adverse
selection and/or moral hazard type effects only by using (quasi-)experimental data or simplifying assumptions.
9
3 MODEL
This section describes the optimization problem solved by an unmarried, childless, em-
ployed individual who makes an annual health insurance decision followed by a sequence of
medical care consumption decisions to maximize the value of his expected discounted future
utility.19 The timing of the model can be observed in Figure 3.1. At the beginning of each
year, y, a forward-looking individual observes the set of health insurance alternatives offered
by his employer, his general health status, and the presence of any illnesses. Before the start
of the first month, t = 1, he chooses the health insurance alternative that maximizes his ex-
pected discounted future utility. Among other things, this expected utility is a function of
anticipated medical care behavior within the year conditional on insurance coverage. In this
research the within-year medical care behavior is modeled explicitly.
At the beginning of each month, an individual learns his illness state, which evolves
stochastically over the course of the year and is influenced by his general health status, illness
history, and previous medical care consumption. After learning his current illness state, the
individual decides how much (and what types of) medical care to consume. The amount he
pays for a unit of medical care depends on the unit price, the cost-sharing characteristics of
his health insurance plan, and his accumulated medical care expenditure within the coverage
year. Much like the price uncertainty individuals face in the US medical care market, the
total price of care is stochastic over time and unknown prior to consumption. After making a
19The model features employed individuals who receive an employer-sponsored health insurance offer (ESHI)
because health insurance information is only available for these individuals in the data. ESHI is the most popular
mechanism by which individuals obtain health insurance in the United States. Of the non-elderly population in
2011: 55.8% held ESHI, 18% were uninsured, 20.5% were insured by state or federal governments, and 5.7%
were privately insured (Kaiser Family Foundation). The model focuses on single, childless individuals in order
to explicitly capture dynamic health, non-linear out-of-pocket prices, and medical care demand throughout the
insurance coverage period. The estimation sample includes men and non-pregnant women.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the Model
y
Annual health
insurance decision
t = 1 t = 2
Monthly medical care decisions
Each month:
(1) Learn illness state
(2) Select among medical care alternatives
(3) Observe updated general health status
t = 12
y + 1
medical care decision, the individual’s general health status evolves prior to the next month.
The remainder of this section explains the model and solution in greater detail.
3.1 Annual and Monthly Decisions
At the beginning of each year, an individual observes the set of health insurance plans
available to him from his employer. Each plan is defined by its premium, network type, and a
set of cost-sharing characteristics. The cost-sharing features enter an individual’s budget con-
straint throughout the year, determining how much is paid out-of-pocket for medical care. The
following plan characteristics enter the model: out-of-pocket premium, composite annual de-
ductible, doctor’s office deductible, hospital deductible, stop loss, hospital co-insurance rate,
hospital co-pay level, doctor’s office co-insurance rate, doctor’s office co-pay level, prescrip-
tion drug co-insurance, and the extent to which the plan restricts coverage to a network of
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physicians (HMO, PPO, or FFS).20 An indicator function, Ijiy, equals one if individual i se-
lects insurance plan j in year y and zero otherwise.21 Only one plan can be held at a time, so
that ∑
j∈Ji
Ijiy = 1 ∀ i ∀ y (3.1)
where J i is the set of exogenously determined employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI)
plans and includes the option to decline all plans.22
In each month, an individual learns his illness state (defined below) before making a
medical care consumption decision. He chooses the number of doctor visits, vit; hospital
days, sit;23 and whether or not to consume prescription drugs, rit.24 The monthly medical care
decision is represented by an indicator function, dvsrit , that equals one if an individual chooses
the bundle (v, s, r) and zero otherwise. Bundles are mutually exclusive with a maximum of
20A deductible and a stop loss are described in footnote 4. A co-insurance rate is the share of the medical
care price that an individual must pay out-of-pocket (the remainder is paid by the insurer). A co-pay level is a
fixed dollar amount that an individual must pay out-of-pocket for a unit of medical care (again, the remainder is
paid by the insurer). A health maintenance organization (HMO) here refers to an insurance plan that limits its
enrollees to receiving medical care from a specified group of providers. A preferred provider organization (PPO)
is a plan that defines a preferred network of providers from which care can be purchased less expensively. If
an enrollee chooses to seek care outside of this network, coverage is still provided but at a higher out-of-pocket
cost. A fee-for-service (FFS) plan covers an enrollee equally at all medical care providers.
21For notational simplicity and consistency, I include the subscript i to describe individual level variables
only when defining the variable. The subscript i is suppressed thereafter.
22Some individuals select a job based (at least partially) on the health insurance offered. However, modeling
an individual’s decision to accept a particular job, with health insurance options as a job characteristic, requires
modeling the employment decision as a function of health insurance characteristics. Thus, this exogeneity
assumption has become the norm in the literature.
23Hospital days are chosen rather than the standard (hospital) nights because inpatient and outpatient hospital
visits are not modeled separately. A visit to the ER and an outpatient procedure each constitute a decision to
consume one hospital day. A single overnight visit reflects a decision to consume two hospital days.
24According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) these three types of care account for
over 80% of personal medical care expenditure in the United States. For the population being analyzed, the
percentage is even higher because individuals are non-elderly and unlikely to consume nursing home care or
home healthcare. Other relevant medical care products, such as dental and optical, are unlikely to be covered by
standard ESHI plans and are thus excluded from the study.
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V doctor visits and S hospital days each month, such that
V∑
v=0
S∑
s=0
1∑
r=0
dvsrit = 1 ∀ i ∀ t. (3.2)
3.2 Health Transitions and Probabilities
Three measures of individual health evolve stochastically over the course of the insurance
year. The acute illness state, Ait = {0, 1}, and the chronic illness state, Cit = {0, 1}, are
dichotomous. General health status, Hit, takes on one of three values: excellent (Hit = 2),
good (Hit = 1), or poor (Hit = 0).25
I define an acute illness as any medical condition that eventually subsides and, under
normal conditions, has no permanent effect on an individual’s health or medical care con-
sumption. This characterization describes both short-natured ailments, such as a common
cold or influenza, as well as non-permanent but persistent conditions, such as a pneumonia or
a broken bone. In estimation, the probability that an individual is in an acute illness state in
month t is determined by a logistic function such that
P (At = 1) = pi
1
t =
exp(α0 + α1Wt + α2H
A
t + α3Mt−1 + α4N
A
t + µ
k
1)
1 + exp(α0 + α1Wt + α2HAt + α3Mt−1 + α4N
A
t + µ
k
1)
(3.3)
where Wt contains demographic factors such as sex, race, income, education, MSA indi-
cator, age, and month indicators; HAt is general health status and illness state entering the
month (1Ht<2,1Ht<1, At−1, Ct−1); Mt−1 is medical care consumption in the prior month
(vt−1, st−1, rt−1); NAt contains interactions of the variables in (Wt,H
A
t ,Mt−1); and µ
k
1
captures unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity for an individual of type k, where
k = 1, ..., K.26 Interactions are used to allow the effect of medical care to vary by illness
25Death is only observed once in the data because the estimation sample includes ages 19-64, so it is not
modeled as a possible health outcome. A death state would be a simple addition with alternative data sets.
26See Section 5.1 for a discussion of estimation and interpretation of unobserved permanent individual het-
erogeneity in this model.
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state entering the month.
I define a chronic illness to be any medical condition that never subsides (e.g., diabetes,
asthma, AIDS) or, under normal conditions, has a permanent effect on an individual’s health
or medical care consumption (e.g., cancer, stroke, hypertension).27 Given the long-lasting
effect of these ailments on health and/or medical care purchasing behavior, the occurrence
of a chronic illness is modeled as a permanent, absorbing state. However, medical care can
be used to control a chronic illness so that it has a lesser negative impact on an individual’s
general health status and acute illness probability. I model the probability that an individual
is in a chronic illness state in month t as a logistic function such that
P (Ct = 1) = γ
1
t =

exp(δ0 + δ1Wt + δ2H
C
t + δ3Mt−1 + δ4N
C
t + µ
k
2)
1 + exp(δ0 + δ1Wt + δ2HCt + δ3Mt−1 + δ4N
C
t + µ
k
2)
if Ct−1 = 0
1 if Ct−1 = 1
(3.4)
whereHCt = (1Ht<2,1Ht<1, At−1).
28
At the end of each month t an individual’s general health status is updated, Ht+1, before
transitioning to the next month t + 1. Motivation for the inclusion of general health status
comes from the household production approach of Grossman (1972), who describes both a
27This definition classifies several permanent physiological conditions as chronic illnesses that are not typi-
cally categorized as such, because the conditions are likely to impact an individual’s future medical care con-
sumption (e.g., amputations, menopause, organ and joint replacement).
28The MEPS data classifies illness by ICD-9-CM condition codes, which would allow for a more detailed
characterization of illness to be integrated into the model. However, any attempt to more narrowly define illness
states would require a significant level of subjectivity and would increase estimation time. For example, I
could feasibly model the number of acute and chronic illnesses rather than using the dichotomous classification;
however, this extension would require an assumption about whether or not a record of reported diarrhea and
reported stomach-ache constitute one illness or two. Similarly, I could define different observed or unobserved
classes of acute and chronic illness (Gilleskie 1998), but again, subjectivity is required in the classification
of reported illnesses. Ultimately, empirical implementation of the model as specified reveals how well the
three health measures (i.e., monthly transitions in general health status, acute illness state, and chronic illness
contraction) and unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity explain medical care consumption behavior.
The answer to this question is important given the models of moral hazard that consider only annual medical
care consumption and one (or no) measure of health variation.
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consumption motive and a production motive for the utilization of medical care. In Gross-
man’s model, an individual consumes medical care to rebuild an ever depreciating stock of
health. The health stock produces health flows (e.g., healthy days), which directly increase
utility and can be used to produce income or other consumption goods. The model presented
in this research takes a similar approach by allowing general health status to enter the utility
function and by allowing general health status to be influenced by past health and medical
care consumption. I assume general health status has the following ordered structure
H∗t+1 = ψ0 + ψ1Wt + ψ2H
H
t + ψ3Mt + ψ4N
H
t + µ
k
3 + ζt+1
and Ht+1 =

2 if κ < H∗t+1
1 if 0 < H∗t+1 ≤ κ
0 if H∗t+1 ≤ 0
(3.5)
where H∗t+1 represents latent general health, H
H
t = (1Ht<2,1Ht<1, At, Ct), and κ is a cut-
off point to be estimated. Assuming ζt+1 follows a logistic distribution, the (ordered logit)
probability of transitioning to each general health level is
P (Ht+1 = 2) = η
2
t+1 = 1− Λ(κ− ψZt)
P (Ht+1 = 1) = η
1
t+1 = Λ(κ− ψZt)− Λ(−ψZt)
P (Ht+1 = 0) = η
0
t+1 = Λ(−ψZt)
(3.6)
where ψ = (ψ0, . . . , ψ3, µk3), Zt = (Wt,H
H
t ,Mt,N
H
t ), and Λ(·) is the logistic function. In
addition to its theoretical relevance, general health status plays an important role in this model
because it gives purpose to medical care consumption when in a chronic illness state, which
is important given that chronic illnesses never expire. Through interactions, this specification
allows medical care consumption to alter the effect that a chronic illness state has on general
health status. For example, according to this model, an individual with diabetes uses insulin
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to lessen the negative impact of the disease on his general level of health - not to cure the dis-
ease. The same could be said of open heart surgery, blood-pressure medication, or asthmatic
inhalers.
3.3 Utility Function and Budget Constraint
Preferences for a medical care consumption bundle (vt = v, st = s, rt = r) in month t
are described by the following contemporaneous utility function29
U(Xt, R,H
U
t , d
vsr
t , µ
k, vsrt ) =
Xω0Rt
ω0R
+ ω1H
U
t + ω2M
U
t + ω3N
U
t + µ
k
4v + µ
k
5s + µ
k
6r + 
vsr
t
= U(dvsrt ) + 
vsr
t
(3.7)
where Xit represents consumption of non-medical goods (determined by the budget con-
straint defined in Equation 3.8); R = (1, sex, race, age); HUt = (1Ht<2,1Ht<1, At, Ct);
MUt = (vt, st, rt, v
2
t , s
2
t ); N
U
t contains interactions of the variables in (H
U
t ,M
U
t ,Wt); the
µk parameters capture unobserved permanent heterogeneity for an individual of type k; and
vsrit is the unobserved utility received from v doctor visits, s hospital days, and consuming
prescription drugs (r = 1) or not (r = 0).30
The monthly budget constraint is
Xt = Yt − Pjt −Ot(vt, st, rt, pvt , pst , prt , ADEt, AHEt, Ijy) (3.8)
where Yit is monthly income; Pijt is the month t premium paid out-of-pocket for plan j; Ot(·)
29This utility function is representative when Xt is greater than or equal to zero. If medical care expenditure
becomes so great that Xt is negative, then the first term
X
ω0R
t
ω0R
is replaced by ω40 ∗Xt to capture the (dis)utility
of negative non-medical good consumption.
30I allow the effect of unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity in the utility function to vary by poly-
nomials in consumption. Thus, unobserved preference for doctor visits is captured by µ4v = vµa4 + v
2µb4;
hospital days by µ5s = sµa5 + s
2µb5; and prescription drugs by µ6r.
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is the out-of-pocket expenditure on medical care in month t; pvit, p
s
it, and p
r
it represent the
total price of a doctor visit, a hospital day, and prescription drugs, respectively; and ADEit
and AHEit represent accumulated out-of-pocket medical care expenditure for doctor visits
and hospital days entering month t, respectively.31 This structure assumes that an individual
consumes all income by the end of each month, as monthly saving decisions are not observed
in the data.32
Having specified the contemporaneous utility function, budget constraint, and all transi-
tions between uncertain illness states and general health status, I denote the set of information
known by an individual at the time of a medical care consumption decision, or his state, as
Ψt = (Wt, Ht, At, Ct, ADEt, AHEt, I
j
y , µ
k, vsrt ). It remains to describe what the model as-
sumes about an individual’s knowledge of medical care prices and out-of-pocket expenditure;
then, the optimization problem can be fully expressed.
3.4 Medical Care Prices and Expenditure
Two characteristics of the medical care marketplace make within-year medical care ex-
penditure an important economic construct. First, most individuals do not pay the total price
of medical care because of a cost-sharing arrangement with their health insurance provider.33
Rather, an individual pays a dollar amount out-of-pocket that is determined by the total price
of medical care, insurance plan characteristics, and accumulated medical care expenditure
31Because an individual faces a binary decision on whether or not to consume any prescription drugs, prit is a
total monthly expenditure on prescription drugs rather than the unit price per prescription.
32French and Jones (2011) examine the effects of health insurance and self-insurance (i.e., savings) on re-
tirement behavior. The authors explain that omitting savings from an individual’s dynamic problem ignores
the ability to smooth consumption through savings, which can potentially overstate the value of insurance. In
simulation, they find that omitting savings from the model does increase the value of insurance, but (retirement)
decision making is unchanged in the no-savings model.
33Medical care can be thought of as having two prices, a list price and a transaction price. The list price
is generally printed on a customer’s bill and can be thought of as the theoretical market price for care. The
transaction price, which is the sum of the insurer’s and insured’s payments, is typically lower than the list price
as insurance companies negotiate for reduced rates from certain medical care providers. Because the list price
is rarely paid in practice, the total price in this model refers to the total transaction amount for a unit of medical
care, which I observe in the data.
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during the coverage year. For example: an individual with a $300 deductible, 10% co-
insurance rate, and $0 of accumulated expenditure who is charged $100 for a doctor visit
pays the full $100 out-of-pocket. However, if the same individual were to have accumulated
$250 in medical care expenditure prior to the visit, then he would pay only $55 out-of-pocket
for the visit ($50 pre-deductible + $5 [= 0.1 ∗ ($100− $50)] post-deductible). An individual
with health insurance characterized by this cost-sharing structure (i.e., a deductible with a
co-insurance rate) faces a non-linear budget constraint. The out-of-pocket expenditure func-
tion, Ot(·), is constructed so that the budget constraint in Equation 3.8 contains these non-
linearities. Precise calculations of out-of-pocket expenditure and accumulated out-of-pocket
expenditure are detailed in Appendix C.
A second characteristic of the medical care market is that individuals are typically uncer-
tain of the total price of medical care prior to consumption. The lack of menu prices, un-
certainty of diagnosis prior to a visit, and wide price variation in local medical care markets
contribute to price uncertainty.34 Despite the evidence, surprisingly few models of medical
care demand allow for this uncertainty. To address this reality, I assume that an individual
does not observe total medical care prices prior to making a medical care decision in each
month. Rather, an individual knows the conditional distributions from which doctor visit
prices, hospital day prices, and prescription drug prices are drawn. An individual makes
medical care decisions by integrating over the three conditional price distributions, which are
estimated from the data.35
The total price distributions are defined asF v(pvt |Φt;λv), F s(pst |Φt;λs), andF r(prt |Φt;λr),
where Φt = (Wt, Ht, At, Ct, HMOj, PPOj, FFSj, µk) is a vector of variables that explain
34In May 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released data showing wide variation
in medical care prices in local medical care markets. Such variation makes it difficult for an individual to know
medical care prices prior to consumption. Recent articles in Time Magazine and The New York Times have also
highlighted the issue of price uncertainty in medical care markets.
35An equilibrium model of the medical care market could conceivably allow for price determination in solu-
tion. Such a model, to be realistic, would have to include as players individuals, providers, hospitals, insurance
companies, employers, and the government since interactions between all of these entities determine prices in
the market.
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variation in the distributions and (λv, λs, λr) are parameters to be estimated. The variables
HMOj , PPOj , and FFSj are indicators of the plan’s coverage type. Coverage type is in-
cluded to capture the negotiation for lower rates by insurance providers who contract with
a network of physicians.36 An indicator of MSA level is included in Wt to capture urban
area variation in prices. In addition to differences attributed to supply side variation, these
distributions depend on individual observed illness states and general health status. Finally,
these medical care price shocks are likely to be correlated with unobserved illness and health
shocks. An individual who receives an exceptionally bad illness shock (e.g., cancer) is also
likely to experience a price distribution that is shifted upward or has fatter tails. For this rea-
son, the three medical care price shocks are likely to be correlated with one another as well.
I allow the permanent unobservables that influence preferences, illness states, and general
health outcomes to also influence the price distributions. Currently, the model does not allow
for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.
3.5 The Optimization Problem
An individual’s objective is to maximize his expected discounted future utility by select-
ing the optimal sequence of medical care bundles, dvsrt , for t = 1, ..., T and insurance plans,
Ijy , for y = 1, ...Y conditional on his state variables in Ψt. I describe an individual’s dynamic
optimization problem in two stages, as insurance decisions are made at the beginning of a
year and medical care is chosen repeatedly over the course of a year.
3.5.1 The Optimal Monthly Decision Rule
Let V achvsr (·t) be the month t value of expected discounted future utility for medical care
decision dvsrt , illness state (At = a, Ct = c), and general health status (Ht = h). Using
Bellman’s Equation (Bellman 1957), this value is constructed as the sum of contemporaneous
36The model does not differentiate between in-network and out-of-network medical care consumption. All
medical care is assumed to be in-network. Insurance cost-sharing characteristics are specific to in-network
consumption.
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utility and the expected discounted future utility yielded by the alternative. Conditional on
unobserved heterogeneity type k (where µk = {µk1, ..., µk14}), insurance plan j, and medical
care prices (pvt , p
s
t , p
r
t ), the alternative-specific value function can be written, for t < T
V achvsr (Ψt, 
vsr
t |µk, Ijy , pvt , pst , prt ) = U(dvsrt ) + vsrt
+ β
2∑
h′=0
[
ηh
′
t+1(Ψt, d
vsr
t )
1∑
a′=0
pia
′
t+1(h
′,Ψt, dvsrt )
1∑
c′=0
γc
′
t+1(h
′,Ψt, dvsrt )
[
V a
′c′h′(Ψt+1|µk, Ijy)
]]
,
(3.9)
and for t = T
V achvsr (Ψt, 
vsr
t |µk, Ijy , pvt , pst , prt ) = U(dvsrt ) + vsrt + β
2∑
h′=0
[
ηh
′
t+1(Ψt, d
vsr
t ) [Qy+1(Ψ0, h
′)]
]
(3.10)
whereU(dvsrt ) is the deterministic part of Equation 3.7, β is the discount factor, andQy+1(Ψ0, h
′)
is the value of expected discounted future utility in month t = 0 of year y + 1. Maximal ex-
pected utility, in illness state (At+1 = a′, Ct+1 = c′) with general health status (Ht+1 = h′),
in month t+ 1 is
V a
′c′h′(Ψt+1|µk, Ijy) = Et
[
max
vsr
V a
′c′h′
vsr (Ψt+1, 
vsr
t+1|µk, Ijy)
]
. (3.11)
The expectation operator is subscripted by t because an individual must form this expectation
prior to learning month t+ 1 medical care preference shocks, vsrt+1.
The value function in Equation 3.9 is written conditional on realized medical care prices.
However, it is assumed that an individual does not know the prices of the three types of
medical care prior to consumption; rather, he knows the conditional distributions from which
these prices are drawn. Solution to the optimization problem requires integration over these
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price distributions. The value function, unconditional on prices, is
V achvsr (Ψt, 
vsr
t |µk, Ijy) =
∫
R3+
f ∗(pvt , p
s
t , p
r
t )V
ach
vsr (Ψt, 
vsr
t |µk, Ijy , pvt , pst , prt )dpvt dpstdprt (3.12)
where f ∗(pvt , p
s
t , p
r
t ) = f
v(pvt ) ∗ f s(pst) ∗ f r(prt ) and f v(·), f s(·), and f r(·) are the conditional
density functions from which pvt , p
s
t , and p
r
t are drawn.
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Conditional on the prior insurance decision and unobserved heterogeneity, a utility maxi-
mizing individual selects each medical care consumption bundle with probability
P (dvsrt = 1) = P
[
V achvsr (Ψt, 
vsr
t |µk, Ijy) ≥ V achv′s′r′(Ψt, v
′s′r′
t |µk, Ijy) ∀ v′s′r′
]
. (3.13)
3.5.2 The Optimal Annual Decision Rule
The problem can be solved backwards to recover the time t = 0, year y value function
conditional on any chosen health insurance alternative j ∈ J iy. That is,
V (Ψ0, H1 = h|µk, Ijy) =
1∑
a=0
pia1(Ψ0, H1)
1∑
c=0
γc1(Ψ0, H1)
[
V ach(Ψ1|µk, Ijy)
]
. (3.14)
Stated explicitly, Equation 3.14 represents the discounted value of optimal future behavior
calculated at the beginning of year y unconditional on the first month acute and chronic illness
state but conditional on general health status entering the year and insurance plan j (i.e., the
expected discounted future value of plan j).38 This value does not completely determine the
optimal insurance alternative, as an individual may have preferences for unobserved insurance
characteristics.39 Therefore, I allow further variation through an additive error term such that
37Conditional on µk (unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity) these distributions are independent;
however, their dependence on µk allows some correlation.
38Notice that general health status in month 1,H1, is already known at this time because it was learned during
the last month of the prior year.
39Unobserved characteristics could be defined coverage restrictions, such as a preexisting condition clause
or referral requirement to see a specialist, which are not modeled; they could also be undefined characteristics
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the expected discounted future value of plan j is
Qjy(Ψ0, H1, φ
j
y|µk) = V (Ψ0, H1|µk, Ijy) + φjy . (3.15)
A utility maximizing individual selects each insurance plan with the probability40
P (Ijy = 1) = P
[
Qjy(Ψ0, H1, φ
j
y|µk) ≥ Qj
′
y (Ψ0, H1, φ
j′
y |µk) ∀ j′
]
. (3.16)
This optimization problem is consistent with our theoretical understanding of insurance
benefits. Health insurance is valuable because it provides risk protection, allows for higher
non-medical consumption when ill, and yields health benefits if additional medical care is
consumed during a coverage year. Further, the model explicitly captures the non-linear re-
lationship between a plan’s expected value at the beginning of a year, its cost-sharing char-
acteristics, and an individual’s uncertainty about his future health, medical care prices, and
medical care demand.
that are unlikely to alter the value of a plan during the year but influence individual decisions, such as the plan’s
order on the application file or brand name. Choice inertia, or the tendency of individuals to simply select the
same health insurance plan that they had in the previous year, is another unobserved factor that may influence
an individual’s observed plan. Handel (2013) finds evidence of substantial inertia in the dynamic insurance
decisions of employees at one large American firm.
40In the optimization problem, an individual has knowledge of Ψ0 at the time of an insurance decision, where
Ψ0 contains the chronic illness state learned in the last month of the previous insurance year. In the data, it
cannot always be determined whether a chronic illness present in first month of the insurance year (which is
often the first month of the survey period) began in the first month or a previous month. Therefore, in order to
allow an individual to make health insurance decisions with knowledge of existing chronic illnesses, I assume
(in estimation) that he learns his first month chronic illness state prior to his health insurance decision in the first
year of optimization.
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4 DATA
My empirical analysis uses data from the 1996-1999 cohorts of the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS).41 MEPS contains detailed health, medical care expenditure, health
insurance, and demographic information for a nationally representative sample of families
and individuals in the United States. New participants are added annually (beginning in 1996
through the present day), drawn randomly from the previous year’s National Health Interview
Survey sample. Individuals in each cohort are interviewed 5 times over the 2 years that follow
January 1st of their cohort year.
The MEPS has two features that make it particularly well suited for the purposes of this re-
search. First, detailed employer level insurance information that can be linked to the individ-
ual file was collected for the 1996-1999 cohorts. Data collectors used information gathered in
the first interview to contact current main employers, from which they obtained premium and
cost-sharing characteristics for all plans offered to the employee. This data feature, which is
unique in national survey data, enables me to model a health insurance decision from the full
set of available alternatives for individuals with participating employers. However, roughly
50% of individuals participating in MEPS are without insurance information in this link file
due to employee and/or employer refusal to reveal information.42 Also, while individuals are
41The data are collected and maintained by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). All
data used in estimation are publicly available, with the exception of the individual insurance plan information.
These restricted files may only be accessed through a Census Bureau Research Data Center (RDC).
42There was one significant change to the collection process that took place after 1996. The 1996 MEPS asked
each employer specific questions regarding their participating employee. This method caused many employees
to refuse to provide their employers information as employees wished to remain anonymous. The method was
also inconvenient for employers because it was much more difficult to provide information about a particular
employee than employees in general. (Legalities also made employers weary of providing employee-specific
information.) Therefore, in 1997 the collection process was altered such that employers were asked about their
general insurance offerings, but not employee specific offerings. AHRQ then used a matching procedure to
identify which offered plan was reportedly chosen by employees.
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interviewed over the course of two years, few employers agree to provide health insurance
plan information at the beginning of each year. Therefore, analysis concentrates on one health
insurance decision and the medical care decisions in the year that follows for each individ-
ual. Second, unlike claims data, the MEPS allows participants to report illness episodes even
when they choose not to consume medical care. This data feature allows endogenous illness
transitions to be modeled.
A number of important assumptions are required to prepare the data for estimation. For
example, each illness, which is defined in the data by an ICD-9-CM medical code, must be
interpreted as an acute or chronic illness. Also, medical care consumption dates and partially
observable illness dates must be used to determine the starting and ending month of illnesses
reported five times over the course of 2 years. I also face the challenge that at least one of
the 12 insurance cost-sharing features is missing in 47% of the 5284 plans observed in the
data, so imputations must be made. The magnitude of these complications, and others, and
the assumptions required to overcome them are discussed at length in Appendix B.
4.1 Determination of the Sample
The sample used in estimation is taken from the nationally representative sample of single
and childless individuals included in the 1996-1999 cohorts of the MEPS survey. (See Table
4.1 for sample size by cohort year and inclusion criteria.) I focus on employed individuals be-
tween the ages of 19 and 64 whose employers sponsor health insurance coverage.43 I exclude
the unemployed and those employed without an insurance offer because only general insur-
ance information was gathered for these individuals (e.g., coverage status, coverage source,
etc.). Employed individuals who receive an insurance offer but choose to be uninsured are in-
cluded in the estimation sample. These omissions are representative of the sample restrictions
43I study individuals over 18 years old to avoid the unique decision-making process of an adolescent with
possible access to his parents health insurance plans. I also exclude full time students under the age of 24
because 1996-1999 federal law allowed these individuals to stay on their parent’s insurance plan. Individuals
under 64 are targeted because they do not yet have access to coverage through Medicare.
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found in similar work.44
Sample inclusion also requires that the ESHI plans that are offered to an individual are
observed in the link file described above. The information contained in the link file is nec-
essary to model an individual’s insurance decisions. Individuals must also participate in all
interviews during the insurance year. The final restriction limits individuals in the sample to
one of two types: (1) individuals taking up ESHI, holding it for an entire year, and holding no
outside coverage; or (2) individuals remaining completely uninsured all year. I do not model
insurance switching during an insurance year and cannot observe privately purchased plan
characteristics.
Table 4.1: Sample Inclusion Criteria
1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1996-1999 MEPS Household Component 22601 13683 11137 14178 61599
and single, childless, 19-64 yrs old 4406 2534 2169 2589 11698
and employed in first interview period with offer 1821 923 987 1128 4859
and matches to link file† 749 516 159 688 2112
and no missing interviews 693 472 139 636 1940
and stable insurance status 455 290 98 389 1232
† There is a disproportionate drop in link file matches in 1998 because AHRQ only attempted to contact employers for 25% of
survey participants who reported being offered health insurance coverage. In all other years, AHRQ attempted to contact employers
for all of these individuals.
The final estimation sample contains 1232 individuals (or 14784 person-month observa-
tions). Table A.1, which can be found in Appendix A, compares the 4859 individuals remain-
ing at line 3 above (which is a nationally representative sample of single, childless, 19-64
year olds, who are employed and offered health insurance from their employer) and those
in the estimation sample. The table reveals few differences between the estimation sample
and a nationally representative sample of this demographic. The estimation sample is slightly
44Cardon and Hendel (2001) limit their sample to single, childless, employed individuals who are between
the ages of 18 and 64. However, these authors include individuals who are not offered health insurance by their
employer. Einav et al. (2013), Kowalski (2013), and Bajari et al. (2013) estimate their models using a sample
of individuals employed by one firm. None of the papers include uninsured individuals in the analysis. Einav
et al. (2013) model the decisions of families. Kowalski (2013) models the behavior of individual employees, but
allows individuals to be in a family of three or fewer people. Bajari et al. (2013) limits analysis to those holding
single health insurance coverage.
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older, a little wealthier, and is comprised of a larger proportion of females. These differences
contribute to higher medical care expenditure in the estimation sample. The estimation sam-
ple is also comprised of more federal employees, which is expected, as no federal employees
are excluded due to employer non-response.
4.2 Sample Statistics
The following tables summarize the mean and dispersion of key variables used in estima-
tion. Table 4.2 compares insured and uninsured individuals in the estimation sample.45 The
insured are older, more educated, and wealthier. They are also more likely to be white and
female. The insured are more likely to enter the insurance year with a chronic illness, are
more likely to get an acute illness at some point during the insurance year, and have more
months where some acute illness is experienced. The insured also consume more units and
greater values of doctor and prescription drug care.46 The percentage of the population that
consumes at least one hospital day during the year (25% of insured and 17% of uninsured in-
dividuals) seems large, but includes emergency room visits as well as outpatient and inpatient
visits. To improve estimation time, I limit the maximum number of doctor visits and hospital
days in a month (V and S from Equation 3.2) to 9 and 5, respectively.47 The insured face
lower (total) prices for doctor visits and hospital days and higher prices for prescription drugs.
45Most variables are self-explanatory. Income is calculated as the sum of post-tax income, sale earnings, and
tax refund. General health status is self-reported, taken from the response to the question “In general, compared
to other people of your age, would you say that your health is excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor?” Roughly
6% of the estimation sample reports poor or very poor health, so the lowest three health categories (fair, poor,
and very poor) are combined to form the poor general health status category seen in the table and used in
estimation. Medical care prices are only observed when medical care is consumed. For more detail on medical
care prices, medical care consumption, and illness occurrence see Appendix B.
46While the uninsured are less likely to have at least one hospital day, the average number of hospital days
for the uninsured is greater than that of the insured. This is likely due to emergency room usage among the
uninsured.
47Of the 14,784 person-month observations in the data, the number of doctor visits exceeds the maximum of
9 only 33 times and the number of hospital days exceeds the maximum of 5 only 30 times. In these instances,
the number of visits/days is set to the maximum and the average price paid for a unit of medical care is adjusted
accordingly. For example, if an individual visits the doctor 12 times in a month with an average price of $100
then the data are adjusted so that he visits the doctor 9 times with an average price of $133.
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Table 4.2: Sample Statistics by Insurance Status
Insured Uninsured
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Demographics (time invariant)
age 40.04 11.62 34.73 11.44
education (highest grade completed) 13.73 2.43 12.46 2.49
income (in 1996 dollars) 35198.52 22120.24 19011.55 13144.27
male 0.48 * 0.52 *
lives in a MSA 0.82 * 0.83 *
Hispanic 0.11 * 0.21 *
black 0.14 * 0.19 *
federal employee 0.09 * 0.09 *
Health and Illness (time varying)
probability of excellent health status in any month 0.31 * 0.32 *
probability of good health status in any month 0.36 * 0.34 *
probability of poor health status in any month 0.33 * 0.34 *
entered year with chronic illness 0.39 * 0.25 *
chronic illness by years end 0.50 * 0.31 *
at least one acute illness during sample year 0.81 * 0.69 *
total months with acute illness 4.62 4.52 2.35 3.21
Medical Care Prices (time varying)
transaction price for a doctor visit 89.19 159.22 112.43 160.52
transaction price for a hospital day 823.31 1357.76 878.72 2127.58
transaction price for a Rx month 75.22 114.94 49.77 54.43
Medical Care Consumption (time varying)
at least one doctor visit in sample year 0.74 * 0.50 *
total doctor visits in sample year 5.22 9.35 2.67 5.64
at least one hospital day in sample year 0.25 * 0.17 *
total hospital days in sample year 0.75 2.41 0.99 4.51
at least one Rx month in sample year 0.67 * 0.45 *
total Rx months in sample year 4.69 5.00 2.22 3.91
consumed any preventative care 0.20 * 0.19 *
probability of consumption in any month 0.62 * 0.45 *
probability of consumption in well month 0.13 * 0.05 *
annual value of doctor visits 454.39 951.61 289.67 759.21
annual value of hospital days† 660.28 2706.30 1108.39 6320.84
annual value of Rx consumption 352.80 819.20 110.57 272.71
Other
number of offered plans 4.41 5.99 3.05 4.46
Sample
individuals 1119 113
person-month observations 13428 1356
† One uninsured individual had hospital expenditures totaling $52,032.16. Removing this outlier lowers the mean to $647.93 for the unin-
sured.
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Table 4.3: Insurance Plan Summary
Held Plans Rejected Plans
plans mean s.d. plans mean s.d.
Premium
total premium 1119 2057.19 819.09 4165 2207.13 715.25
out-of-pocket premium 1119 343.83 540.31 4165 519.46 610.28
Deductible†
defined by total expenditure 397 283.59 272.99 772 293.25 348.26
defined by doctor expenditure only 59 191.38 97.04 655 215.72 50.65
defined by hospital expenditure only 28 252.63 218.10 62 150.58 41.24
plan has no deductible 648 * * 2684 * *
Stop loss
stop loss 729 1512.82 1077.97 2775 1689.06 1077.63
plan has no stop loss 390 * * 1390 * *
Hospital‡
co-insurance rate 417 17.02 9.91 797 15.44 8.01
co-pay level (per stay) 199 258.46 346.70 768 159.41 194.45
co-pay level (per day) 85 52.61 60.25 142 58.70 85.24
free care past the deductible 435 * * 2577 * *
Doctor
co-insurance rate 208 18.91 8.69 755 12.43 7.83
co-pay level 858 10.19 4.53 3110 8.41 4.25
free care past the deductible 53 * * 300 * *
Network Type
HMO 1119 0.42 * 4165 0.51 *
FFS 1119 0.47 * 4165 0.44 *
PPO 1119 0.11 * 4165 0.06 *
† These categories are not mutually exclusive. Some of the plans that feature a doctor specific deductible also feature a hospital specific
deductible.
‡ These categories are not mutually exclusive. Some of the plans are structured so that an individual pays a daily co-pay, plus a percentage
(i.e., co-insurance rate) of the remainder of the bill.
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The large variance in prices is due to the broad classification of medical care consumption
types. High priced procedures (e.g., outpatient hospital surgery) and low priced procedures
(e.g., emergency room visit for a sprained ankle) contribute to the same price distribution. An
individual is considered to have consumed any preventative care if during the sample period
they consume any form of medical care in a month in which they have no acute illness or
chronic illness.
Differences between the chosen and rejected plans can be observed in Table 4.3. The
table suggests that individuals have a general preference for lower premium and therefore
less generous (in terms of cost-sharing features) plans. Compared to the average rejected
plan, held plans are more likely to have a deductible, less likely to have a stop loss, and set
higher thresholds when the plan has a deductible or stop loss. Held plans also feature higher
co-insurance rates and co-pay levels for both doctor and hospital care, with the exception of
hospital per day co-pay.
Though it cannot be taken directly from these tables, extracting insurer profit and mark-up
information from the data is straightforward. Given total annual expenditure on doctor, hos-
pital, and prescription drug services, insurers loose money on 16% of the observed contracts.
The average loss is roughly $3800. Conversely, insurers profit on the remaining 84% of ob-
served contracts, with a mean profit of $1638. These statistics suggest an average mark-up
of $788, or 38% above the average premium of $2057. (Note: these figures assume that ex-
penditure is limited to the three types of medical care consumption that is modeled. Because
some additional types of consumption are covered, this is an upper bound on the markup.)
4.3 Prescription Drugs
Several assumptions are required to fit the prescription drug data available in the MEPS
to the within-year decision-making model presented in Section 3. First, the employer ques-
tionnaire used to gather insurance information asks whether each plan “covers” outpatient
prescriptions (99% of all plans in the sample do), but does not ask the co-insurance or co-pay
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level, whether there is a separate deductible for prescription drugs, or whether cumulative
deductibles and stop losses apply to prescription drugs expenditure. Therefore, I assume that
HMO, PPO, and FFS plans have a fixed prescription drug co-insurance rate of 13%, 17%,
and 19% respectively. These rates are consistent with the average rates in the 1996 MEPS
Abstraction file.48 I also assume that prescription drug expenditure is completely unrelated
to a plan’s deductible and stop loss.49 This assumption is also informed by the 1996 MEPS
Abstraction file, which finds that prescription drug expenditure had no relation to a deductible
for 77% of held plans and had no relation to the stop loss for 44%. According to the Kaiser
Family Foundation’s Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey, by 2000 prescription drug
expenditure had no relation to the stop loss in over 75% of ESHI plans.
Second, I assume that an individual decides whether or not to consume any prescription
drugs each month, not the number of prescriptions to fill. In addition to making estimation
more tractable, this assumption acknowledges the doctors role in the prescription drug deci-
sion. Often times multiple drugs are prescribed such that consuming two, as opposed to one,
prescription drugs in no way reflects a marginal decision by an individual and is unlikely to
further improve wellness. Also, the survey collects the number of refills of each prescription
in each interview period, but provides an exact date only the first time a prescription is pur-
chased. Furthermore, while the exact medication name and quantity are provided, there is no
record of whether or not an individual actually consumed the medicine. Therefore, I assume
that all patients are prescribed the average dosage for a medication.50 I then use this dosage,
48Co-pays are a much more popular form of cost-sharing for prescription drugs than co-insurance rates (68%
vs. 32% in 1996). However, co-pays make the number and timing of refills a relevant factor in analysis, which I
would like to abstract from. Further, 80% of all ESHI plans feature multi-tier prescription drug coverage in the
form of co-pays by 2000 (Kaiser EHBAS). Thus, correctly implementing co-pays for prescription drug coverage
would require both a quantity and quality decision by individuals.
49Unrelated means that the insurer and insured share the total cost of prescription drugs from the first day
of an insurance year to the last, irrespective of accumulated expenditure. Also, out-of-pocket prescription drug
expenditure does not contribute to the accumulated expenditure relevant for the cumulative deductible or stop
loss.
50I use “Mosby’s Pharmacology in Nursing,” to determine the average dosage of each medication found in
the data. My imputations were then double checked by a doctor. More details can be learned in Appendix B.
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along with the date the prescription was first filled, the number of refills, and the quantity
(which is usually number and strength of pills) of the drug in the prescription, to construct a
starting date and ending date for each drug consumed. I then smooth payments for the drug
over the course of the consumption period, because the model does not distinguish between
the payment for and consumption of prescription drugs.
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5 EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
For each individual surveyed in the 1996-1999 MEPS I observe one health insurance deci-
sion (covering one year of behavior) followed by medical care consumption and prices, illness
states, and general health status outcomes over the next two years. Therefore, I estimate the
structural parameters of the model described in Section 3 using one year of data for each
individual. In what follows, I describe the challenges in estimation, discuss identification and
unobserved heterogeneity, and construct the estimated likelihood function.
5.1 Approximating the Future Value of a Medical Care Alternative
Solution to the optimization problem requires the calculation of an individual’s value
function for each medical care bundle in each month. According to Equation 3.9, the value
of bundle (v, s, r) in month t, Vvsr(Ψt), is a function of the maximal expected utility in the
next month, V (Ψt+1), where the future state vector, Ψt+1, is unknown. Thus, in order to
calculate Vvsr(Ψt) in practice, a value V (Ψt+1) is needed for every potential outcome of Ψt+1
following every potential history of outcomes (Ψ0, . . . ,Ψt). Given the number of months in a
year, the number of variables in the state vector, and the fact that several of the state variables
are continuous, the number of required future values grows exponentially.
To avoid what Bellman (1957) refers to as the “curse of dimensionality,” I use an inter-
polation technique developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) to approximate an individual’s
maximal expected future value in each month. The method works as follows: beginning in
the last month of a year, t = T , I draw 3500 random outcomes of the state vector, ΨT . I
then calculate maximal expected future utility for each draw according to Equation 3.11. By
estimating a linear regression of these values on the state variables in ΨT , I generate a map-
ping from any possible state to expected future values. This mapping can be used in month
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T − 1 to approximate the maximal expected future value of month T , because each alterna-
tive in month T − 1 generates a probability distribution over ΨT . By repeating this process
backwards (hence backwards solution), I can solve the model back to month t = 0.
A related challenge in solving any finite horizon dynamic problem is determining the
maximal expected future value in the final period; Qy(Ψ0, H1) from Equation 3.10. I take
a popular approach, which is to formulate a closing function to approximate this value. I
assume that this value is determined by a non-stochastic (i.e., no error term) linear function
of the state variables entering the first month of the following year, medical care consumed
in month T , and a vector of parameters. I estimate these parameters as part of the MLE
procedure.
5.2 Identification
I estimate the following sets of parameters (252 parameters in total)
Acute Illness Parameters: ΩA = {α00, ..., α49}
Chronic Illness Parameters: ΩC = {δ00, ..., δ32}
Health Status Parameters: ΩH = {ψ00, ..., ψ49, κ}
Price Parameters: ΩP = {λx00, ..., λx19, σx}x∈{v,s,r}
Preference Parameters: ΩU = {ω00, ..., ω40, β}
DFRE Parameters: Ωµ =
{{µk1, ..., µk14, θk}4k=1}
Closing Function Parameters: ΩF = {γ00, ..., γ11}
Initial Condition Parameters: ΩI =
{
α˜00, ..., α˜19, δ˜00, ..., δ˜15, κ˜, ψ˜00, ..., ψ˜16
}
Parameters are identified by individual decisions, the model’s economic constraints, and
parametric assumptions. Identification of acute illness, chronic illness, and general health
status parameters comes from the logit assumption and covariance between the independent
and dependent variables. For example, the effect of medical care on illness probabilities is
identified by individuals in the same illness state making different medical care consumption
decisions and getting different illness outcomes the following month. The identification of
parameters in the conditional price distributions is similar, though a gamma distribution is
assumed. Initial condition parameters are separately identified from transition parameters by
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four exclusion restrictions and the logit assumption.51
The identification of the preference parameters is less straightforward. The marginal
(dis)utility of medical care, ω2, is identified through variation in the types of medical care
consumed, holding state variables fixed. Insurance cost-sharing features help identify these
parameters by often making the expected out-of-pocket cost of medical care equal across the
three types. The effect of general health status and illness state on utility, ω1, is identified by
the optimization framework and through variation in total monthly medical care consump-
tion for individuals in different wellness states. For example, the marginal disutility of acute
illness is identified by differences in total consumption between individuals who are identi-
cal except in their acute illness states. An acute illness yields disutility if an individual with
an acute illness consumes more medical care (and therefore takes on the costs of consum-
ing care) than an individual without an acute illness, in an attempt to cure the illness. This
example also explains why the disutility of chronic illness is not identified and is, therefore,
not included as a direct determinant of utility in estimation. Chronic illnesses never subside,
meaning the only justification for additional medical care consumption once a chronic illness
is obtained is to diminish the marginal negative effect of that chronic illness on the general
health status (and acute illness probability). Therefore, disutility from chronic illness is not
separately identified from the disutility of poor general health.
Separately identifying moral hazard effects from adverse selection is an important empir-
ical challenge in this research. There is not a single parameter in the model that identifies
the effect of moral hazard (instead, simulation techniques are used); however, the curvature
parameters in the utility function, ω0, are especially important when calculating moral haz-
ard effects because health insurance cost-sharing characteristics and medical care prices enter
the optimization problem by altering the consumption of non-medical goods. The data used
in estimation have two features that assist in the identification of these parameters. First,
51Income last year, an indicator for missing last years income, veteran status, and foreign birth status are
included in the estimation of initial condition probabilities but not in transition probabilities.
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twelve medical care decisions, often made at different points in the medical care price dis-
tribution, are observed for each individual. The covariance between these decisions and the
out-of-pocket cost of medical care helps to identify the curvature parameters. However, the
out-of-pocket cost of medical care is endogenous because health insurance is chosen by an
individual with expectations of future medical care consumption (adverse selection). A sec-
ond data feature helps to mitigate this problem. Much like the data used by Cardon and
Hendel (2001), each individual in the sample selects health insurance from a different set of
alternatives. The degree of variation in the alternative sets is widened by the employer’s role
in determining the out-of-pocket premium paid for a plan. This variation ensures that indi-
viduals with similar expectations of future medical care consumption select different health
insurance plans and ultimately face different out-of-pocket medical care costs. If insurance
alternative sets are determined exogenously, then the variation in alternative sets reduces the
endogeneity of out-of-pocket medical care costs.
Modeling the observed health transitions also helps the model separate selection effects
from price effects. In general, the key unobservable that contributes to the unexplained cor-
relation between insurance generosity and annual medical care expenditure is an individual’s
expectation of future health. If an individual expects poor future health outcomes then he
purchases generous coverage and (often) has high medical care expenditures. Rather than us-
ing parametric assumptions and the optimization framework to capture heterogeneity in the
health expectations that lead to adverse selection, I model observed health and illness out-
comes over the health insurance year. By modeling these outcomes and solving the problem
backwards, an individual’s expectations of future health outcomes are modeled explicitly and
impact the valuation of each health insurance plan.
5.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
I capture unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity in the model using a discrete
factor random effects method (DFRE). The DFRE approach avoids restrictive distributional
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assumptions by allowing the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to be approximated by
a discrete step-wise function (Heckman and Singer 1984; Mroz and Guilkey 1992). Mroz
(1999), and more recently Guilkey and Lance (2013), use Monte Carlo simulation in a two-
equation setting to show that when the true error distribution is joint normal, DFRE estimates
are comparable to those derived using the correct distribution. However, when the true error
distribution is not normal, the DFRE outperforms all other (tested) estimation methods.
In this model, illness and general health outcomes, medical care prices, and medical care
decisions are each partially determined by unobservables (i.e., an error term), which can be
decomposed into two components. The first component, a non-linear discrete factor µk, rep-
resents individual-specific persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The second component is the
remaining i.i.d. serially-uncorrelated random error. The population is assumed to have K
unobserved types, which are drawn from discrete distribution Θ. The estimation technique
determines the value of each discrete factor, {µk1, ..., µk14}, for K-1 types (K-1 because iden-
tification requires that one type has all discrete factors set to zero) and the probability of each
type, θk; where
∑K
k=1 θ
k = 1.
In addition to improving the fit of the model, the DFRE method captures unobserved het-
erogeneity that may induce adverse selection. For example, an individual with an unobserved
(to the econometrician) health condition is also more susceptible to acute illness, chronic
illness, poor general health status, and greater medical care consumption. The estimation
procedure identifies this unobserved heterogeneity type by unexplained correlation between
the dependent variables and allows the type to influence his valuation of each health insurance
plan.
5.4 Estimation Procedure
I estimate the model’s parameters, Ω, using a nested fixed point solution algorithm (Rust
1987). The inner algorithm solves the dynamic programming problem for a given set of
parameters and for each mass point in the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. The outer
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algorithm uses the resulting probabilities and densities to calculate the likelihood function,
L(Ω), and attempts to improve the likelihood value using a BHHH gradient method (Berndt,
Hall, Hall, and Hausman 1974). Standard errors are taken from the main diagonal of the
BHHH (i.e., outer product of the gradient) matrix, which approximates the negative of the
inverse Hessian.
An individual contributes to the likelihood function the product of his observed illness
state, general health status, medical care price, medical care choice, and insurance choice
probabilities. General health status and illness state probabilities take on closed forms due
to the logit assumptions in Section 3. I assume that prices are gamma distributed so that
probability density function values f v(·), f s(·), and f r(·) of the following form enter the
likelihood function
f(p;σ, ξ) =
1
Γ(σ)ξσ
pσ−1e
−p
ξ (5.1)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function and ξ and σ are the scale and shape parameters of the
gamma distribution, respectively. I parameterize ξ such that ξ = Φt ∗ λ, which allows state
variables within the model to affect the scale of the price distributions, but not the shape.
I assume vsrt and φ
j
y each follow a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. This assumption
simplifies estimation in two ways. First, it can be shown that when vsrt is Type 1 Extreme
Value the expectation in Equation 3.11 is equal to
V (Ψt|µk, Ijy) = EC + ln
(
V∑
v=0
S∑
s=0
1∑
r=0
exp
(
V vsr(Ψt|µk, Ijy)
)) ∀t (5.2)
where EC is Euler’s Constant. The assumption simplifies solution to the optimization prob-
lem, as calculation/simulation of a (V ∗ S ∗ 2) − 1 dimensional integral would be required
if another popular continuous distribution without a closed form (e.g., normal) were cho-
sen (see Keane and Wolpin 1994). Second, the additive Type 1 Extreme Value distribution
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assumptions yield choice probabilities that have the following closed form structures.
P (dvsrt = 1|Ψt, µk, Ijy) =
exp
(
V vsr(Ψt|µk, Ijy)
)∑V
v′=0
∑S
s′=0
∑1
r′=0 exp
(
V v′s′r′(Ψt|µk, Ijy)
) ∀t,∀vsr (5.3)
P (Ijy = 1|Ψ0, µk) =
exp
(
Qj(Ψ0, µ
k)
)∑Ji
j′=0 exp
(
Qj′(Ψ0, µ
k)
) ∀y,∀j (5.4)
The likelihood contribution for individual i in month t conditional on µk and observed Ht
is
Lit(Ω|µk, Ijy , Ht = h) =
(
[pi0t (·|µk)]1−At [pi1t (·|µk)]At
)(
[γ0t (·|µk)]1−Ct [γ1t (·|µk)]Ct
)1−Ct−1
V∏
v=0
S∏
s=0
1∏
r=0
[
f v(pvt |µk)[1−d
0sr
t ]f s(pst |µk)[1−d
v0r
t ]f r(prt |µk)[1−d
vs0
t ]
P (dvsrit = 1|Ψt, Ijy , µk)
2∏
h′=0
ηh
′
t+1(Ψt, d
vsr
t |µk)1Ht+1=h′
]dvsrt
.
(5.5)
The first row contains the illness state contribution for month t. The price densities are in the
second row. The [1−d0srt ] exponent ensures that price of a doctor visit in month t contributes
to the likelihood function only if an individual actually visits the doctor, which is the only time
that I observe this price (this is true for each type of care). The third row contains both month
t choice probabilities and the probabilities of transitioning to a new general health status
entering month t + 1. To control for endogenous initial conditions, Li1(Ω|µk, Ijy , Ht = h)
appears as above with the first row replaced by
2∏
h=0
(
η˜h1 (·|µk)1H1=h
)(
[p˜i01(·, h|µk)]1−A1 [p˜i11(·, h|µk)]A1
)(
[γ˜01(·, h|µk)]1−C1 [γ˜11(·, h|µk)]C1
)
.
(5.6)
These initial probabilities (η˜, p˜i, γ˜) are separately estimated from transition probabilities (with
exclusion restrictions) and are allowed to vary by modeled unobserved heterogeneity.
I write Lit(Ω|µk, Ijy , Ht = h) conditional on (Ht = h) because I only observe general
38
health status in months where an interview is conducted.52 Therefore, I integrate over the
general health status distribution in months where health is missing. The total likelihood
contribution for individual i conditional on µk is then written
Li(Ω|µk) =
Ji∏
j=1
[
P (Ijiy = 1|Ψ0, µk)
T∏
t=1
Lit(Ω|µk, Ijy)
]Ijiy
. (5.7)
The contribution of individual i unconditional on the unobserved heterogeneity is
Li(Ω) =
K∑
k=1
θkLi(Ω|µk). (5.8)
52For most individual’s, I observe 4 measures of self-reported health. The first report, which is used for the
initial condition, is taken from the NHIS report provided in the previous year. The second and third reports are
taken from MEPS interviews conducted during the health insurance year. The fourth report is take from the third
MEPS interview, which occurs during the insurance year for some, but occurs after the end of the insurance year
for others. I use the third interview self-reported health level for the the last month general health outcome even
if the interview occurs past the end of the health insurance year.
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6 RESULTS
This section begins with parameter estimates. I then discuss model fit, the estimated effect
of moral hazard, and model predictions under several counterfactual situations.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 6.1 reports estimated preference parameters. A constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) parameter, RA, can be calculated for each individual using (ω00, ω01, ω02, ω03).53
Non-whites and males are found to be significantly less risk averse than whites and females.
Risk aversion is increasing in age.54 A 40 year-old white male has RA = 0.866, whereas a 40
year-old white female has RA = 0.879. At the sample mean, RA = 0.925. These estimates
are between the Blau and Gilleskie (2008) estimate of 0.96 and the Imai and Keane (2004)
and Sauer (2012) estimate of 0.74; none of which allow for heterogeneity in risk preferences
by demographic group. Parameters (ω10, . . . , ω12, ω30, . . . , ω32) capture disutility from poor
health and acute illness. Note that an individual in good (but not excellent) health receives
a contribution of ω10 to his utility function, while an individual in poor health receives a
contribution of ω10 + ω11. The direct utility effect of medical care consumption is captured
by (ω20, . . . , ω24, ω33, . . . , ω38).55 Interpreting the linear and quadratic consumption terms is
53The CRRA risk aversion parameter is calculated as RA = [1−ω00−ω01 ∗ age−ω02 ∗nonwhite−ω03 ∗
male]. Age is scaled in estimation so that the youngest individual included (19) has an age of 0. A 40 year-old,
then, has an age of 21.
54There is a large literature on the relationship between risk aversion and demographics. Croson and Gneezy
(2009) summarize the literature on gender and risk, which consistently finds women to be more risk averse.
Eckel (2008) also find that women are more risk averse than men, but find no significant race effect and mixed
age effects. Rosen, Tsai, and Downs (2003) find gender and race effects that are similar to those that I find, but
do not study age.
55These parameters can be interpreted as the net direct effect of medical care consumption on utility. The
physical, psychological, and time cost of medical care consumption may have negative effects on these pa-
rameters. However, some individuals may enjoy consuming medical care, independent of its productive health
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not useful without also considering the discrete factor terms discussed in the next paragraph.
However, these parameters do reveal that men have significantly lower preferences for doctor
visits and prescription drugs than women. Further, preferences for doctor visits are decreas-
ing in age while preferences for prescription drugs are increasing in age. The final parameter
of the utility function reflects the disutility of each dollar of negative consumption (i.e., out-
spending monthly income, requiring an individual to use savings or to borrow) and is not
currently estimated.
The parameters in Table 6.2 describe the discrete step-wise function used to approximate
the joint distribution of unobservables in the model. The technique uses the estimation proce-
dure to group the population of individuals by unobservables and estimate the relative effect
these groups have on the model’s probabilities, along with the probability of being in a partic-
ular group.56 For identification, one group’s mass points and probability parameter must be
normalized to zero (though not necessarily the same group). I fix both for group 1. Estimation
reveals that 7.5% of the population is in group 1 [1 − 0.576 − 0.170 − 0.179 = 0.075]. The
preference parameters in Table 6.1 fully describe preferences for this group. One oddity of
this group is that its females derive utility directly from prescription drug consumption (ω24).
The other three groups are similar in health and in medical care preferences (µ1, . . . , µ6 in
Table 6.2). In comparison to group 1, these individuals are less likely to get an acute illness,
more likely to get a chronic illness, and are in a better general health status. They also receive
greater disutility from all 3 medical care types. Of the four groups, group 2 seems to represent
individuals who are in the best state of (unobserved) wellness, with the lowest preferences for
medical care. Group 1 represents individuals with the worst state of (unobserved) wellness,
effects, which has a positive effect on these parameters.
56The number of points of support (or groups) is chosen by the econometrician. It is suggested by Mroz
(1999) that this number should be chosen using an “upwards-testing approach based on the increase in the quasi-
likelihood function value when one adds an additional point of support.” This technique is cost prohibitive in this
work because additional mass points increase estimation time substantially. Instead, I use an upwards-testing
approach that requires a significant improvement in the likelihood function and an improvement in model fit to
add additional points of support. I arrive at 4 mass points in the current model.
41
Table 6.1: Preference Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate S.E.
Utility Function
RA constant ω00 0.1785 0.0073
RA age ω01 -0.0030 0.0003
RA non-white (black or Hispanic) ω02 0.0324 0.0055
RA male ω03 0.0126 0.0059
less than excellent health ω10 -18.5305 2.9335
less than good health ω11 -13.8780 1.8515
acute illness ω12 -17.2095 3.3050
doctor visits ω20 -0.2258 0.0814
doctor visits2 ω21 0.0355 0.0053
hospital days ω22 -2.8720 0.2164
hospital days2 ω23 0.4089 0.0422
any Rx consumption ω24 1.8402 0.3495
less than excellent health*age ω30 0.0280 0.0223
less than good health*age ω31 -0.0031 0.0264
acute illness*age ω32 -0.0139 0.0170
doctor visits*age ω33 -0.0080 0.0009
doctor visits*male ω34 -0.1888 0.0215
hospital days*age ω35 0.0014 0.0030
hospital days*male ω36 0.0811 0.0586
any Rx consumption*age ω37 0.0411 0.0047
any Rx consumption*male ω38 -1.5221 0.0869
negative consumption† ω40 0.0010 *
Other
discount factor† β 0.996 *
log-likelihood value‡ L(Ω) -78920.570 *
† Not currently estimated. Note that β is set to 0.996, instead of the traditional 0.95, because this is a monthly
model. 0.99612 ≈ 0.95
‡ The log-likelihood value with only one unobserved mass point is -82869.49.
with the highest preferences for medical care. Groups 2 and 3 lie somewhere in the middle.
It is well known in the health economics literature that estimating the productive effects of
medical care (on health and/or illness) is challenging. The unconditional correlation between
medical consumption and wellness is usually negative because an individual consumes more
medical care when sick. The negative correlation likely reflects bias associated with selection
into consumption and omitted health or medical care heterogeneity. In this research, I address
the first issue by modeling medical care consumption (i.e., the heath input) and allowing for
common unobserved individual heterogeneity that affects both medical care decisions and
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Table 6.2: Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameter Estimates
Param. Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Mass Point Location
acute illness probability µ1 -0.955 0.087 -0.282 0.085 -0.410 0.090
chronic illness probability µ2 4.782 1.059 4.959 1.055 4.625 1.052
health status probability µ3 0.141 0.055 0.168 0.055 0.050 0.053
doctor visit preference (linear) µa4 -0.859 0.065 -0.400 0.057 -0.333 0.055
doctor visit preference (squared) µb4 0.064 0.009 0.016 0.009 -0.005 0.008
hospital day preference (linear) µa5 -1.076 0.191 -0.041 0.087 -1.371 0.217
hospital day preference (squared) µb5 0.296 0.056 0.093 0.037 0.313 0.065
any Rx preference µ6 -6.026 0.269 -1.569 0.257 -1.117 0.262
doctor visit price distribution µ7 0.034 0.028 -0.025 0.032 -0.187 0.031
hospital day price distribution µ8 0.021 0.047 -0.112 0.122 0.078 0.150
monthly Rx price distribution µ9 -1.658 0.026 -2.104 0.020 -1.019 0.021
initial acute illness probability µ10 -1.077 0.336 0.117 0.366 0.091 0.372
initial chronic illness probability µ11 -1.624 0.448 0.175 0.466 0.397 0.495
initial health status probability µ12 0.905 0.298 0.761 0.322 0.661 0.329
Type Probabilities†
parameter estimate θ 2.038 0.143 0.803 0.159 0.863 0.159
type probability 57.6 17.0 17.9
† Probabilities are derived from estimation of parameter θk such that Pr(µk) = exp(θk)∑4
k′=1 exp(θ
k′ )
.
health outcomes. I address the second issue by simultaneously controlling for 3 measures
of health (i.e., acute illness, chronic illness, and general health status) and by allowing the
productivity of each type of medical care to vary by illness state. Table 6.3 reports acute and
chronic illness probability parameter estimates and Table 6.4 contains general health status
probability parameter estimates. For each health outcome, parameter estimates tell a consis-
tent story of wellness persistence (i.e., if an individual has ailment A in month t then he is
more likely to have ailment A in month t+ 1) and cross-wellness effects (i.e., if an individual
has ailment A in month t then he is more likely to have ailment B in month t + 1). The
effectiveness of medical care varies by care type and health measure. All medical care types
are productive in preventing and curing an acute illness. Only prescription drugs (δ32) are
productive in preventing chronic illness. In fact, doctor visits and hospital days are found to
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Table 6.3: Illness Probability Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate SE
Acute Illness†
constant α00 -1.6066 0.1690
male α10 -0.4522 0.0399
non-white (black or Hispanic) α11 -0.1844 0.0413
education (highest grade completed) α12 0.0154 0.0073
age α13 -0.0046 0.0041
lives in a MSA α14 -0.0015 0.0169
income (in 1996 dollars) α15 0.0028 0.0011
acute illness α20 2.7578 0.0824
chronic illness α21 0.2383 0.0802
less than excellent health α22 -0.0050 0.0472
less than good health α23 0.4982 0.1235
doctor visits α30 -0.1120 0.0210
hospital days α31 -0.1346 0.0284
Rx consumption α32 -0.2751 0.0476
acute illness*doctor visits α40 0.0444 0.0151
acute illness*hospital days α41 0.0557 0.0240
acute illness*Rx consumption α42 0.1069 0.0448
chronic illness*doctor visits α43 0.0637 0.0141
chronic illness*hospital days α44 0.0867 0.0241
chronic illness*Rx consumption α45 0.0108 0.0099
acute illness*age α46 0.0238 0.0034
chronic illness*age α47 0.0034 0.0031
less than excellent health*age α48 0.0021 0.0044
less than good health*age α49 -0.0082 0.0049
Chronic Illness
constant δ00 -9.2185 1.0961
male δ10 -0.0243 0.0203
non-white (black or Hispanic) δ11 -0.0746 0.0250
education (highest grade completed) δ12 0.0097 0.0052
age δ13 -0.0130 0.0019
lives in a MSA δ14 0.2156 0.0431
income (in 1996 dollars) δ15 0.0011 0.0006
acute illness δ20 0.1573 0.0331
less than excellent health δ21 0.6176 0.1283
less than good health δ22 0.5753 0.1241
doctor visits δ30 0.2018 0.0140
hospital days δ31 0.1074 0.0260
Rx consumption δ32 -1.9013 0.1305
†Month indicators are included in regression but are not reported here.
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Table 6.4: General Health Status Probability Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate SE
General Health Status
constant ψ00 4.3994 0.1663
male ψ10 -0.0864 0.0333
non-white (black or Hispanic) ψ11 0.0097 0.0329
education (highest grade completed) ψ12 0.0165 0.0061
age ψ13 -0.0066 0.0039
lives in a MSA ψ14 -0.0004 0.0042
income (in 1996 dollars) ψ15 0.0049 0.0011
acute illness ψ20 -0.1424 0.0573
chronic illness ψ21 -0.4984 0.0656
less than excellent health ψ22 -2.8126 0.1580
less than good health ψ23 -2.9158 0.1527
doctor visits ψ30 -0.1231 0.0137
hospital days ψ31 -0.1989 0.0228
Rx consumption ψ32 -0.4861 0.0526
acute illness*doctor visits ψ40 0.0711 0.0088
acute illness*hospital days ψ41 0.0896 0.0147
acute illness*Rx consumption ψ42 0.1282 0.0238
chronic illness*doctor visits ψ43 0.0330 0.0064
chronic illness*hospital days ψ44 0.0582 0.0151
chronic illness*Rx consumption ψ45 0.4655 0.0492
acute illness*age ψ46 -0.0005 0.0024
chronic illness*age ψ47 -0.0005 0.0024
less than excellent health*age ψ48 0.0103 0.0055
less than good health*age ψ49 -0.0159 0.0051
cut-point κ 3.4409 0.0690
Month indicators are included in estimation but are not reported here.
increase the likelihood of chronic illness, though the effect is small.57 Medical care does little
to improve an individual’s general health status. Neither doctor visits (ψ30, ψ40, ψ43) nor hos-
pital days (ψ31, ψ41, ψ44) positively impact general health status transitions. However, acute
and chronic illness does impact transitions between the healths status outcomes. Prescription
drugs maintain or improve general health status when an individual has a chronic and acute
57Medical care consumption types are not interacted with illness states in the chronic illness probability
because there is not enough variation in the data to identify the parameters. Keep in mind that 39% of the
population enters the insurance year with a chronic illness, so they provide no contribution to the monthly
probability of chronic illness contraction. By years end, 50% of the total population has a chronic illness,
meaning that of the (roughly) 8,100 chronic illness probability contributions to the likelihood function, only 135
reflect chronic illness contraction.
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illness (ψ32, ψ42, ψ45).58
Price, initial condition, and closing function parameters can be found in Tables A.2, A.3,
and A.4, which are located in Appendix A.
6.2 Model Fit
I use simulation techniques to assess the fit of the model. Using observed initial conditions
and insurance offer sets, I simulate annual insurance and monthly medical care decisions,
monthly illness state and general health status transitions, and monthly medical care prices
for each of the 1232 observed individuals. Using random draws from the appropriate error
distributions, I replicate the simulation 100 times. I compare the average across simulated
replications with their observed counterparts. Standard errors have not yet been calculated
for model fit comparisons.
A good indicator of model fit is total annual expenditure, as it requires proper fit of all
three consumption and price distributions. Figure 6.1 shows both observed and simulated
annual expenditure distributions. The figure reveals an underprediction of zero medical care
expenditure (11% of the simulated sample vs. 22% of the observed data). What is not im-
mediately evident from the figure, but is shown in Table 6.5, is that the observed distribution
also has a higher mean and standard deviation than the simulated distribution. Matching the
observed annual expenditure distribution is a difficult endeavor even in annual expenditure
models. The research cited earlier often struggles to explain the same unique features of the
observed expenditure distribution seen here; namely, the large mass at zero and the long right
tail. In this research, annual medical care expenditure is an outcome that is determined by
unit consumption decisions and prices. Table 6.5 shows that the simulated means and standard
deviations of all three price distributions are lower than those of the observed distributions.
Most importantly, the standard deviation of the simulated doctor visit price distribution is
58While seemingly counter-intuitive, it is not too surprising that medical care consumption has few positive
effects on general health status given that the measure is self-reported. Medical care consumption could serve
as a signal/reminder to an individual that he is not in perfect health, making a negative report more likely.
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much lower than the standard deviation of the observed distribution. Experimentation has
shown that when the price parameters are adjusted so that the simulated means and standard
deviations more closely match the observed, the mean and standard deviation of the simulated
expenditure distribution improves substantially. This improvement comes at little or no cost
to the fit of other simulated variables. Thus, the fit of the price and expenditure distributions
may benefit from an alternative distributional assumptions for prices.59
Figure 6.1: Annual Medical Care Expenditure
This figure compares observed and simulated annual expenditure distributions.
The horizontal axis is log-scaled, so that markers are spaced exp(1.0) apart.
Simulated annual medical care consumption and monthly consumption by illness state
appear to match the observed data well in Table 6.5. However, the full consumption distribu-
tions displayed in Table 6.6 mirror a problem with the expenditure distribution; the model is
59The model presented in this research assumes that all three prices are drawn from gamma distributions. An
earlier version of the model was estimated assuming log-normal distributions, which provided a worse fit for
the hospital price distribution and prescription drug price distribution but a better fit for the doctor visit price
distribution. The model is currently being reestimated assuming the doctor visit price distribution is log-normal
and the hospital day and prescription drug price distributions are gamma. My preference would be to use a
conditional density estimator like Gilleskie and Mroz (2004), but the estimator requires a significant increase in
the number of estimated parameters, which could increase estimation time prohibitively.
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Table 6.5: Observed and Simulated Outcomes
Observed Simulated
mean median s.d. mean median s.d.
Total Annual Expenditure 1470.09 347.58 3654.74 1243.80 425.25 2761.98
Medical Care Prices†
doctor visit price 90.26 55.00 159.30 89.46 63.54 87.42
hospital day price 828.10 329.60 1436.26 827.42 342.88 1364.75
prescription drug price 74.06 41.62 112.99 67.31 37.08 90.71
Medical Care Consumption
annual doctor visits 4.89 2.00 8.69 4.83 2.00 6.26
annual hospital days 0.65 0.00 2.00 0.60 0.00 1.40
months with Rx cons. 4.46 2.00 4.95 4.17 2.00 4.43
% consuming (any month) 43.59 * * 44.17 * *
% consuming, Ait = 1 71.70 * * 70.79 * *
% consuming, Cit = 1 72.89 * * 69.17 * *
% consuming, Ait = Cit = 0 9.25 * * 15.07 * *
Monthly Health
% with acute illness 36.41 * * 34.79 * *
% with chronic illness 44.03 * * 43.75 * *
% in excellent health 32.55 * * 31.03 * *
% in good health 35.82 * * 38.89 * *
% in poor health 31.63 * * 30.08 *
Held Insurance Types
% No Insurance 9.16 * * 16.52 * *
% HMO 37.96 * * 33.55 * *
% PPO 10.14 * * 9.89 * *
% FFS 42.74 * * 40.03 * *
† Prices are only observed when an individual consumes medical care; thus, the simulated mean and standard deviation are calculated
only from individuals consuming care in simulation.
currently unable to generate enough zero-consumers. The largest difference is found for doc-
tor visits. Again, manual manipulation of model parameters shows that if these consumption
distributions can shift some mid-range consumers to zero consumption, then the expenditure
distribution improves.60
Table 6.5 also reveals that simulated monthly health status and illness state probabilities
60The DFRE method being used does improve the fit of all 3 consumption distributions in the appropriate
directions (namely, the model that allows for four unobserved types generates significantly more zero-consumers
than the model with only one unobserved type). However, adding additional mass points does not further
improve the fit of these distributions. The model is currently being reestimated with a more flexible medical
care preference structure to allow for more zero-consumers.
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Table 6.6: Observed and Simulated Annual Consumption
Doctor visits Hospital days Prescriptions
obs. sim. obs. sim. obs. sim.
0 28.22 18.94 75.83 72.25 35.44 30.43
1 16.06 17.76 12.08 16.40 13.06 14.36
2 12.73 12.68 4.87 4.46 5.92 8.11
3-5 18.41 21.22 4.79 5.07 8.14 13.09
6-9 10.46 13.88 1.46 1.52 7.79 12.31
10+ 14.12 15.52 0.97 0.30 27.66 21.69
The table reports annual consumption levels for the observed and simulated sam-
ples. The values are the proportion of the samples consuming at each level. For
example, the top left entry states that 28.22% of the observed sample visited a
doctor’s office zero times during the insurance year. The prescription drug levels
are measured in consumption months.
match the observed data well. With regard to the fit of health insurance type, the current
parameter estimates predict that too many individuals choose to be uninsured. The over-
prediction is a result of the expenditure distributions’ thin right tail. When the variances of
medical care prices are manually increased to match the data, not only does the mean and
variance of the expenditure distribution increase but the likelihood of being insured does as
well.
6.3 Moral Hazard
Empirical studies of moral hazard often quantify the effect of insurance possession on
medical care consumption and, at times, measure the welfare implications of this additional
consumption. In this dissertation, I do the former and discuss the latter in Appendix D. A
well known measure of the relationship between a health insurance and medical care demand
is the single price/co-insurance elasticity of medical care demand, which was made popular
by RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) researchers. In more recent work, researchers
have calculated the proportion of total annual expenditure (when insured) that is caused by
insurance possession (Bajari et al. 2013) as a measure of moral hazard effects. My preferred
measure, and the measure that I focus on in this research, is the average increase in total
annual expenditure due to insurance coverage (Einav et al. 2013).
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To be more precise, I calculate the percentage increase in mean total annual medical care
expenditure in the population when individuals are moved from an uninsured state into their
preferred health insurance plan. I calculate this statistic in two stages. In the first stage, I use
the model to forward simulate behavior assuming that all individuals are without insurance. In
the second stage, I simulate the model while forcing all individuals to select a health insurance
plan from the alternative set offered by their employer. Mean predicted expenditure without
coverage is $668. Row 1 of Table 6.7 reports the predicted increase in total annual medical
care expenditure when individuals move from no insurance to their preferred plan. Mean
expenditure increases by $615, or by 92%; however, these moral hazard effects vary widely
across the population and are driven by those with very large increases in expenditure. If the
top 1% of additional spenders (i.e., those with spending increases in excess of $10,515) are
removed, then the mean expenditure increases 65% in response to insurance acquisition.61
Furthermore, 44% of the sample does not increase its spending at all in response to coverage.
In Row 2, I report the estimated effect of moral hazard on expenditure when individuals are
moved from no coverage to full coverage, which allows for comparisons across papers. The
out-of-pocket insurance premium is assumed to be zero with full coverage.
Table 6.7: Predicted Effect of Insurance Possession on Medical Care Expenditure
Mean 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
Expenditure increase going from
no coverage to preferred coverage 615 0 22 300 1,445 3,122
no coverage to full coverage 741 0 84 583 2,027 3,806
As stated above, there are many different measures moral hazard effects reported in the
literature. By simulating behavior under various insurance conditions, I am able to calculate
61This begs the question, why are these few individuals consuming so much more care in response to cover-
age? In the model, large expenditures are driven by high medical care price draws. Thus, the strong reaction to
coverage by some is often driven by a modest increase in consumption that results in a very large expenditure
increase due to the price shock. Imagine, for example, a sprained ankle. Without insurance an individual may
wait several days to see if the injury will heal on its own. With insurance, the individual may go to the emer-
gency room immediately, which leads to a room charge, an x-ray, and the purchase of a removable cast, each of
which can carry a substantial cost.
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several of these measures using my model and data. These comparisons are reported in Table
6.8. As presented in Row 1, Manning et al. (1987) use the experimental RAND HIE data
and “two- and four- part” models to estimate a co-insurance (arc) elasticity of medical care
demand of 0.17 for the 0-25% co-insurance range and 0.22 for the 25-95% co-insurance
range. To calculate comparable measures, I simulate the within-year decision-making model
under three cost-sharing arrangements. All three arrangements feature no deductible, no stop
loss, and no premium; differing only by a universal co-insurance rate, which is set to 0%,
25%, or 95%.62 I estimate a co-insurance elasticity of medical care demand of 0.18 for
the 0-25% co-insurance range and 0.28 for the 25-95% co-insurance range. The remaining
three comparisons are straightforward. The measures used by Keeler and Rolph (1988) and
Einav et al. (2013) compare expenditure under full insurance and no insurance. The measure
used by Bajari et al. (2013) compares expenditure under no insurance and observed/preferred
insurance status.63
This exercise highlights an important feature of the within-year decision-making model.
In principle, the flexibility of the model allows one to calculate other measures of moral
hazard effects that are observed in the literature so that comparisons can be drawn. However,
despite my efforts, the various moral hazard measures reported in Table 6.8 are not truly
comparable. Each of these studies uses a different population of individuals in their empirical
analysis. These populations differ in observed features, likely differ in unobserved features,
and select health insurance from different sets of alternatives; all of which are likely to impact
62The RAND HIE plans had no premium and those used for price elasticity estimation had no deductible.
The plans did feature a $1000 stop loss, but efforts are made by the researchers to avoid the distortions in price
elasticity estimates caused by this dynamic incentive for reasons explained in Keeler et al. (1977). Specifically,
Manning et al. (1987) “examine demand for episodes of treatment by individuals who are more than $400 from
their (stop loss) limit. This strategy gives an approximation of the true price effect if such people treat the true
probability of exceeding their limit as nearly zero.” Rather than recreating their approximation technique, I
eliminate the stop loss in simulation.
63Kowalski (2013) also estimates the average increase in expenditure when moved from no insurance to full
coverage. She finds an increase of only $16 (in 2003 dollars), meaning a comparable moral hazard estimate to
Einav et al. (2013) would be less than 1%. Also, note that Bajari et al. (2013) do not allow for income effects
in their estimate, by adjusting the budget constraint in the no-insurance case so that the observed consumption
bundle is guaranteed to be affordable. Their estimate would increase without this adjustment.
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Table 6.8: Other Measures of the Effects of Moral Hazard
Measure
Reported
Estimate
Within-Year
Model Estimate
Manning et al. (1987)a Co-insurance arc elasticity
of medical care demand
0%→25%, 25%→95%b
0.17, 0.22 0.18, 0.28
Keeler and Rolph (1988) Proportion of full insurance
expenditure not explained
by moral hazardc
55% 49%
Einav et al. (2013) Percentage increase in mean
annual expenditure, no
insurance to full coveraged
30% 111%
Bajari et al. (2013) Proportion of preferred insur-
ance expenditure explained
by moral hazarde
45% 48%
a These results are also reported in Keeler and Rolph (1988).
b The arc elasticity is calculated as Earc = ((q2 − q1)/(p2 − p1)) × ((p2 + p1)/2)/((q2 + q1)/2), where q is mean annual
medical care expenditure and p is the co-insurance rate. Manning et al. (1987) make this calculation for each type of care and then
weight elasticities for various types of care by share of spending.
c q2i/q1i is calculated for each individual, where q2i is total annual medical care expenditure with a 95% co-insurance rate (near
no insurance) and q1i is total annual medical care expenditure with full insurance for individual i. The population mean is reported
above.
d (q2 − q1)/q1 is calculated, where q2 is mean total annual medical care expenditure for the population under full coverage and
q1 is mean total annual medical care expenditure for the population under no coverage.
e (q2i − q1i)/q2i is calculated for each individual, where q2i is total annual medical care expenditure with preferred/chosen
coverage and q1i is total annual medical care expenditure with no coverage for individual i. The population mean is reported above.
the estimated effect of moral hazard on medical care consumption.64
Thus, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the comparisons made in Table 6.8 serve
to provide some external validity for my findings. The table suggests that the within-year
model predicts a level of price sensitivity that is near what has been found in the literature,
but due to both observed and unobserved differences in estimation samples, these estimates
64The RAND HIE data used by Manning et al. (1987) and Keeler and Rolph (1988) include both children and
married individuals, while my data do not. Einav et al. (2013) and Bajari et al. (2013) use claims data from a
single employer, though not the same employer. In general, employer data feature a more homogenous popula-
tion and insurance plans are selected from a limited set of health insurance alternatives, which are subsidized by
the employer. Analysis is also limited to insured individuals, as claims data are not collected for those declining
coverage. Bajari et al. (2013) include all employees selecting single coverage, while Einav et al. (2013) include
all employees. Also, individuals in each of these studies face vastly different healthcare environments, as my
data were collected from 1996-1999, the RAND HIE data used by Manning et al. (1987) and Keeler and Rolph
(1988) were collected from 1974-1980, and the claims data used by Einav et al. (2013) and Bajari et al. (2013)
were collected from 2003-2006 and 2002-2004, respectively.
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are not directly comparable with those found in the literature. Second, an important objective
of this research project is to determine whether or not a model of within-year medical care
decision making produces moral hazard effects that are different from an annual expenditure
model. One way to answer this question is to compare my estimates to the estimates of Bajari
et al. (2013) or Einav et al. (2013), who each estimate structural annual expenditure models.
However, again due to differences in estimation samples, this approach would be naive.
In what follows, I perform a series of counterfactual simulations to study how different
assumptions imposed on a within-year decision-making model lead to different moral hazard
effects. By using the same model and data across simulations, I can isolate the impact that
specific assumptions have on estimated moral hazard effects, which is not possible when
comparing results across papers. The most important counterfactual imposes on the within-
year decision-making model a set of assumptions that are consistent with the assumptions
made implicitly in most annual expenditure models.
6.3.1 Moral Hazard and Modeling Assumptions
The assumptions imposed on a behavioral model are likely to impact the estimated effects
of moral hazard. For example, if medical care consumed over the course of the insurance
year is allowed to improve an individual’s health, then simulating behavior under no cov-
erage should produce the following: an immediate reduction in medical care consumption
due to higher out-of-pocket costs (price effect), followed by an increase in the occurrence
of illness and poor health outcomes, followed by an increase in medical care consumption
(health effect), as he attempts to cure the illness and improve his health status. A model that
does not allow medical care to improve future illness and health outcomes predicts only the
price effect. Therefore, a model that allows medical care to improve health over the course
of the year should predict greater medical care consumption in the uninsured state, producing
a smaller moral hazard effect. Assumptions concerning an individual’s knowledge of current
and future price and health outcomes may affect estimated moral hazard effects as well. For
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example, if an individual does not know the total price of medical care prior to consumption,
then loss of insurance coverage represents not only an increase in the out-of-pocket cost of
medical care but exposure to greater uncertainty as well.65 If an individual is risk averse,
then his medical care consumption should respond more (negatively) to the loss of insurance
coverage when he does not know medical care prices prior to consumption. As a result, a
model that assumes medical care prices are unknown prior to consumption should produce
larger moral hazard effects.
The within-year decision-making model allows medical care consumption to alter future
health outcomes, assumes medical care prices are unknown prior to consumption, and allows
for uncertainty about future within-year medical care price and health outcomes. The annual
expenditure models of Cardon and Hendel (2001), Einav et al. (2013), and Kowalski (2013)
are characterized by a health insurance decision at the beginning of a year, followed by an
exogenous annual health shock, which is followed by an annual medical care expenditure
decision.66 However, an individual represented by the data used in estimation actually makes
a series of daily medical care consumption decisions and receives multiple health shocks
over an insurance year; thus, a number of assumptions are made implicitly in these models
in order to aggregate behavior and outcomes up to an annual level. First, as the annual health
outcome is assumed to be exogenously determined (i.e., independent of prior medical care
consumption), so too are within-year health outcomes (assumption 1). Second, in order for
a daily decision maker to be able to optimally determine his aggregated annual expenditure
level, medical care prices must be known at the time of purchase (assumption 2). Third,
65Health insurance cost-sharing characteristics protect the insured by truncating the right tail of the medical
care price distribution. For example, assume an insured individual knows that upon visiting the hospital he faces
a total price of $500 with probability 0.90 or $2,000 with probability 0.10. Assuming a $300 deductible and $50
hospital co-pay, an insured individual faces a maximum out-of-pocket cost of $350. An uninsured (risk averse)
individual is worse off than an insured individual for two reasons: he faces a larger expected out-of-pocket cost
($650) and receives disutility from exposure to the risk of a high price draw.
66Bajari et al. (2013) is similar but does not feature an insurance decision. Also, unlike the other papers listed,
Bajari et al. allow for some uncertainty at the time of medical care consumption. The authors assume that an
individual selects his total annual medical care expenditure while knowing the distribution of the proportion of
that expenditure he must pay out-of-pocket, rather than the exact proportion.
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the annual expenditure model assumes that all uncertainty is revealed prior to an expenditure
decision. This assumption suggests that all health and price shocks that a daily decision
maker receives over the course of an insurance year are known at the beginning of the year
(assumption 3).
I use the within-year decision-making model and estimated parameters to calculate the
effect of moral hazard under assumption 1 (simulation 1), under assumption 2 (simulation
2), and under assumptions 1, 2, and 3 (simulation 3); where the last set of assumptions is
most representative of an annual expenditure model. The moral hazard effect is calculated
by simulating the model twice for each set of assumptions: once assuming individuals have
no health insurance and once assuming individuals hold health insurance (i.e., their selected
plans when forced to hold coverage; from Section 6.3). To impose an assumption of exoge-
nous monthly health transitions (assumption 1) on the within-year decision-making model,
I update monthly illness states and general health status using a predetermined set of out-
comes, rather than allowing illness and general health probabilities to be altered by medical
care consumption.67 In simulation, an individual still solves the optimization problem as if
medical care is productive as the model’s parameters reflect that this is the primary benefit
of consuming medical care. To impose an assumption of price certainty prior to medical
care consumption (assumption 2) on the within-year decision-making model, an individual
receives one price draw for each type of medical care in each month, rather than integrating
67The predetermined set of illness and general health outcomes is taken from the simulation in Section 6.2
(i.e., simulation under normal conditions). Ideally, observed outcomes from the data would provide the exoge-
nous transitions needed for simulation 2, as these outcomes would best reflect the assumptions of those modeling
annual expenditure decisions under alternative insurance schemes. However, because general health status is
not observed in every month in the data, this alternative set of outcomes is used.
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over the conditional distribution from which prices are drawn.68 Perfect foresight (assump-
tion 3) is imposed on the model by providing an individual with all future price, health, and
preference shocks in the first month of the insurance year.
Without altering any assumptions of the within-year decision-making model, health in-
surance acquisition is predicted to increase mean annual medical care expenditures by 92%.
(I refer to this simulation as the preferred simulation.) In simulation 1, assuming that within-
year health transitions are exogenous increases the estimated effect of moral hazard to 100%,
which is consistent with discussion above. In the preferred simulation, the probability of
acute illness increases by 2.9% in the first three months (due to lower medical care consump-
tion when uninsured), leading to an increase in medical care consumption throughout the
remainder of the year.
In simulation 2, where prices are known prior to consumption, health insurance acquisi-
tion is predicted to increase mean annual medical care expenditures by 81%, which is consis-
tent with the discussion above. In this simulation, the decrease in medical care consumption
caused by the loss of health insurance is 14.5% for doctor visits, 44.4% for hospital days,
and 1.7% for prescription drugs. In the preferred model, the decrease is 20.1% for doctor
visits, 78.0% for hospital days, and 1.7% for prescription drugs. If the price paid for medical
care were the same in simulation 2 as it is in the preferred simulation, then this consumption
pattern would suggest a much larger difference in estimated moral hazard effects. However,
because individuals in simulation 2 observe medical care prices, they strategically purchase
medical care at lower prices when uninsured. The average price paid for medical care de-
creases by 7.5% for doctor visits and 63.8% for hospital days when individuals lose health
68In practice, an individual receives one set of 12 price draws for each of the three types of medical care.
Each of the 12 price draws corresponds to a specific combination of acute illness state, chronic illness state,
and general health status. This strategy ensures that when an individual receives a high price draw he cannot
simply wait for a lower price to arrive in the following month. A new set of prices is then drawn if his illness
state or general health status changes. Note that in simulation 2, at any given time, an individual only knows
the medical care prices that correspond to his current illness state and general health status. He does not know
the price that he would face in another wellness state, nor does he know that prices will remain the same in the
following month if his wellness state remains unchanged.
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insurance in simulation 2. In the preferred simulation, the decrease is 1.1% for doctor visits
and 39.9% for hospital days.
In simulation 3, which most closely reflects the assumptions of an annual expenditure
model, moral hazard is predicted to increase mean annual medical care expenditure by 74%.
This estimate is smaller than the moral hazard effect produced by the preferred simulation
(92%). The estimate is also closer to the moral hazard effects generated by annual expen-
diture models in the literature. The change in the price paid for medical care caused by the
loss of health insurance in simulation 3 is almost identical to simulation 2. The root cause of
the lower estimated moral hazard effect is that medical care consumption decreases more (in
response to the loss of coverage) in simulation 2 than in simulation 3. The decrease in simu-
lation 3 is 13.7% for doctor visits, 30.7% for hospital days, and 1.7% for prescription drugs.
The decrease is greatest in the preferred simulation. In simulation 3, an individual solves a
model where medical care is thought to not only improve his illness state in probability, but
with certainty. Greater consumption when uninsured results, as some individuals consume
more medical care (despite its cost) because knowledge of the illness shock ensures that the
medical care will improve their illness state in the following month.
In summary, this research assumes that medical care decisions are made throughout an
insurance year under conditions of uncertainty. This uncertainty makes medical care less
valuable, as medical care consumption requires an individual to forgo a level of non-medical
consumption that is known with certainty, in favor of an uncertain level of non-medical con-
sumption and no guarantee of improved health. Health insurance reduces an individual’s
exposure to the financial risk that is associated with medical care consumption. When uncer-
tainty at the time of medical care consumption is removed from an individual’s optimization
problem, medical care becomes more valuable, which leads an individual to consume more.
An uninsured individual gains the most from the removal of uncertainty, because prior to re-
moval he is exposed to the greatest level of risk. The burden of uncertainty when uninsured
ultimately leads the within-year decision-making model to generate a larger moral hazard
57
effect than what has been estimated previously in the literature.
6.3.2 Moral Hazard and Insurance Status
Among the many positive features of the MEPS data, the inclusion of both insured and
uninsured individuals is of particular use in the study of moral hazard. In the U.S., the insured
and uninsured populations have different observed and (likely) unobserved characteristics
which may lead to differential responses to health insurance acquisition. Identifying this
difference is important because many of the key economic questions relating to moral hazard
effects focus on either the insured or uninsured population, but not both. For example, to
study the welfare implications of overconsumption caused by moral hazard, one must know
how much more medical care the insured population consumes because of their insurance;
however, the response of uninsured individuals to coverage is not relevant. Conversely, to
predict the increase in medical care consumption that would result from a strict individual
health insurance mandate (100% coverage), one must have an estimate of how much more
uninsured individuals consume once they become covered; however, the response of insured
individuals to coverage is not relevant. The recent literature that studies moral hazard effects
has utilized claims data (Bajari et al. 2013; Einav et al. 2013; Kowalski 2013), which does
not include the medical care consumption patterns of uninsured individuals, so moral hazard
effects cannot be estimated for that group.
I conduct a series of counterfactual simulations in order to study differences in how the
insured and uninsured populations respond to a change in insurance status. First, I allow
individuals to select health insurance optimally, as in Section 6.2, which identifies each indi-
vidual as insured or uninsured. I then simulate behavior for each individual in an uninsured
state and in an insured state, where the uninsured group from the first step is forced to select
a plan, as in Section 6.3. I then calculate the response to insurance acquisition for both the
group that finds it optimal to purchase insurance and the group that finds it optimal not to
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purchase insurance. I find that the insured group increases mean annual medical care expen-
diture by 96% ($728 to $1426) and the uninsured group increases mean annual medical care
expenditure by only 55% ($366 to $568).69 As expected, the differential response is driven
by both observed and unobserved differences between the two sets of individuals. Table 6.9
shows that the uninsured are younger, poorer, more likely to be male, and, in this sample,
enter the year in a better illness state. According to Table 6.1 males have significantly lower
preferences for doctor visits and prescription drug consumption and Table 6.5 suggests that
medical care consumption is lower when individuals are in a better illness state. Also, the
uninsured are more likely to be of the unobserved type 2, which is associated with overall
wellness and low preferences for medical care.
Table 6.9: Characteristics of the Insured and Uninsured
Insured Uninsured
Observed Characteristics
male 0.48 0.53
black or hispanic 0.26 0.30
education 13.7 12.95
age 39.9 36.8
MSA 0.84 0.76
income 34728.3 26064.7
acute illness at t = 1 0.38 0.32
chronic illness at t = 1 0.38 0.27
poor health at t = 1 0.30 0.30
good health at t = 1 0.34 0.33
excellent health at t = 1 0.36 0.37
number of plans available 5.6 2.9
Unobserved Types
type 1 0.09 0.01
type 2 0.56 0.75
type 3 0.17 0.09
type 4 0.18 0.15
Simulated Individuals 10,881 1,449
These differences first lead uninsured individuals to purchase less generous plans when
69Finkelstein et al. (2012) find that previously uninsured individuals in Oregon increase their medical care
expenditure by 25% the first year after gaining access to Medicare; Baicker et al. (2013) find an increase of 35%
in the second year.
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forced into coverage (they also choose from less generous alternatives sets). In comparison
to the plans selected by the insured population, those wishing to remain uninsured select a
plan that has a higher out-of-pocket premium; that is more likely to have a deductible and,
conditional on having a deductible, has a larger deductible; that is equally likely to have a stop
loss but, conditional on having a stop loss, has a larger stop loss; that has less generous doctor
and hospital cost-sharing characteristics; and that is more likely to be a FFS type plan. The
differential response to insurance acquisition between the insured and uninsured is driven in
part by the less generous plan features that characterize the plans selected by the previously
uninsured; however, the uninsured are less responsive to insurance acquisition independent
of insurance selection. In another counterfactual simulation, I force all individuals into a
common plan and calculate moral hazard effects separately for the insured and uninsured
groups.70 I find that mean annual medical care expenditure in the insured population increases
by 66%; while mean annual medical care expenditure in the uninsured population increases
by 47%.
As mentioned above, accounting for differential responses to insurance acquisition can
be important for certain policy questions. For example, assume one is interested in how to-
tal U.S. medical care expenditure would be affected by a new health insurance policy that
required all individuals to purchase coverage. There are several measures of moral hazard ef-
fects that could be taken from this research, or outside literature, to predict the such a change
in expenditure.71 If one assumes that the average uninsured individual responds to coverage
just as the average insured individual does, then the policy leads the previously uninsured
to increase their medical care expenditure by 96%, which is $43.2 billion (in 2011 dollars)
70The common plan is a fee-for-service plan that has an annual out-of-pocket premium of $500, a deductible
of $200, a stop loss of $1500, a doctor visit co-pay of $10, a hospital co-insurance rate of 15%, and a prescription
drug co-insurance rate of 19%.
71The moral hazard effects estimated in this research were not derived with an objective of predicting changes
in total U.S. medical care expenditure in response to a change in insurance policy. The estimation sample
includes single, childless, employed individuals who get an insurance offer from their employer. However, this
exercise exemplifies how even small differences in the estimated effects of moral hazard for different populations
can lead to large differences in policy predictions.
60
of new spending.72 This assumption would be required in order to use the estimated moral
hazard effects of (Bajari et al. 2013; Einav et al. 2013; Kowalski 2013), who only study in-
sured individuals, to answer this question. If, on the other hand, one assumes that the average
uninsured individual responds to coverage just as the average individual (independent of cov-
erage status) does, then the policy leads the previously uninsured to increase their medical
care expenditure by 92%, which is $41.4 billion (in 2011 dollars) of new spending. However,
if one fully account for the differences between the insured and uninsured populations, then
the policy leads the previously uninsured to increase their medical care expenditure by 55%,
which is $24.8 billion (in 2011 dollars) of new spending.
6.4 Counterfactual Experiment: An Individual Health Insurance Mandate
Among other things, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires
almost all U.S. citizens to carry a minimal amount of health insurance coverage.73 This in-
dividual mandate is one of the more controversial pieces of the law. Proponents argue that
forcing the (presumably young and healthy) uninsured into the market will help to indemnify
the risk pool, subsidizing insurance premiums for the sick. Opponents worry that increased
spending, due to moral hazard, will follow the increase in insurance coverage. Thus, in de-
signing the individual mandate, policy makers must consider both the rate at which individu-
als who are currently uninsured will purchase coverage (for a given penalty) and the increase
in medical care expenditure that results from the increase in coverage. The within-year model
presented in this dissertation has the capacity to predict both of these outcomes.74
72Average medical care expenditure among the 47 million uninsured U.S. citizens in 2011 was $958 (in 2011
dollars, MEPS).
73Individuals with incomes below the tax filing threshold ($9,750 for an individual in 2013) and those who
cannot find coverage that costs less than 8 percent of their income are exempt from penalties imposed on the
uninsured.
74This counterfactual implements the individual mandate provision of the ACA only. There are many other
regulations that the ACA will impose upon the marketplace that are not considered. Furthermore, the empirical
analysis conducted here focuses on a population of individuals who are unmarried, childless, employed, between
the ages of 19 and 64, and have the ability to purchase health insurance through their employers.
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Under the ACA, an individual who is currently uninsured and receives an ESHI offer
faces the following three alternatives: (1) purchase a plan through his employer, (2) remain
uninsured and pay a penalty, or (3) purchase coverage privately (potentially thorough a newly
formed health insurance exchange). In this policy simulation, I limit the alternative set to
options (1) and (2).75 Table 6.10 reports the predicted rates of health insurance take-up for
a number of different penalties. Row 1 provides the predicted percent of the population that
chooses to remain uninsured, despite receiving an ESHI offer, when there is no penalty for
refusing coverage. Rows 2, 3, and 4 mimic the planned penalties that the ACA will enforce
in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. The 2016 penalty represents fully implementation of
the policy. In 2014, an individual who does not possess the minimal level of health insurance
coverage is required to pay a penalty of $95 (in 2014 dollars) or 1% of his income (whichever
is larger).76 The model predicts that the percentage of uninsured individuals will decrease in
the first year from 11.8% to 9.6%, or that 81.7% of the previously uninsured individuals will
remain uninsured. Rows 4 through 12 report the percent of individuals who remain uninsured
given larger flat rate penalties, but holding the percentage of income penalties fixed at the
2016 level of 2.5%.
The table offers two interesting findings. First, the planned penalty for 2016 (i.e., the
greater of $695 or 2.5% of income) reduces the percent of uninsured individuals in the pop-
ulation from 11.8% to 6.0%. The demographic make-up of the uninsured population used
75Private health insurance is rarely purchased by individuals receiving an ESHI offer in the US because ESHI
plans are generally subsidized by employers and receive preferential tax treatment. Health insurance that is
provided to employees as part of a compensation package is not taxed by the US government. Plans purchased
on the private market are paid for with taxable income. However, some single individuals who receive an ESHI
offer will be eligible to enroll in a health insurance exchange and will qualify for tax credits. To purchase health
insurance through a newly formed health insurance exchange, an individual’s least expensive ESHI option must
have an out-of-pocket premium that exceeds 9.8% of his income or his employer’s premium contribution is less
than 60% of the premium. To receive a tax credit, an individual’s income must be between 100 and 400 percent
of the federal poverty line (about $11,490 to $45,960 for a single individual in 2013).
76To discount the penalties to 1996 dollars I assume an inflation rate of 3% for all years after 2013 and the
average annual CPI inflation rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for years between 1996 and 2013.
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Table 6.10: Predicted Health Insurance Coverage Rate
Penalty % Uninsured % Remaining Uninsured
1996 dollars 2016 dollars % of income
0.00 0.00 0.0 11.8 100.0
61.82 95.00† 1.0 9.6 81.7
205.14 325.00‡ 2.0 7.4 63.1
425.54 695.00 2.5 6.0 50.9
489.83 800.00 2.5 5.8 49.3
612.28 1000.00 2.5 5.1 43.3
734.74 1200.00 2.5 4.4 37.9
918.41 1500.00 2.5 3.7 31.8
1224.56 2000.00 2.5 2.9 24.4
1530.70 2500.00 2.5 2.2 18.6
1836.84 3000.00 2.5 1.6 13.5
2142.98 3500.00 2.5 1.3 11.0
2449.12 4000.00 2.5 1.0 8.8
† In 2014 dollars.
‡ In 2015 dollars.
in estimation and simulation make this take-up rate particularly important. The sample in-
cludes single, employed individuals, who are likely healthier and wealthier than the average
uninsured individual in the population. Therefore, a high take-up rate for this subgroup is
necessary for the success of the bill, which requires the healthy to purchase coverage in or-
der to subsidize the premiums of the sick. The proportion of uninsured individuals could be
further reduced below 3% of the population by increasing the flat penalty to $2000 (in 2016
dollars). Second, the table highlights the difficulty that policy makers face in producing uni-
versal coverage using an incentive-based scheme. As the penalty is raised, those who remain
uninsured are the least sensitive to further penalties. For example, increasing the flat penalty
from $1000 to $1500 (in 2016 dollars) decreases the percentage of uninsured individuals by
1.4 percentage points. As an additional $500 is added to the penalty repeatedly, the percent-
age of uninsured individuals decreases but at a decreasing rate: 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.3, etc. If the
goal is universal coverage, then an alternative policy of forced take-up (implemented by em-
ployers, who could be required to enroll employees in a default health insurance plan) may
be preferable, but is not without consequence. Using the model and estimated parameters, I
63
calculate the average expected welfare loss of among uninsured individuals from this policy
to be $1608 (2016 dollars).77 Note that this penalty is more than two times the fixed dollar
penalty at full implementation.
I am also able to examine how total annual medical care expenditure responds to an in-
dividual mandate. Assuming premiums and medical care prices are unchanged, spending
among previously insured individuals remains unchanged. Among previously uninsured in-
dividuals, mean annual medical care expenditure for the newly insured increases by 77%
(moral hazard effect), while expenditure for those remaining uninsured falls by 2.4% (in-
come/penalty effect). The net effect on the population as a whole is a 1.3% increase in
medical care expenditure. This effect is small for several reasons. First, only 11.8% of the
population is uninsured prior to the policy and are at all affected (under the assumption that
medical care prices and insurance premiums are unaffected by the policy). Second, only half
of these individuals acquire coverage and increase their spending. Third, the absolute level of
mean spending among the newly insured is small relative to those previously insured ($637
vs. $1448, respectively).
77The average expected welfare loss is measured as the average penalty that would make an uninsured individ-
ual indifferent between remaining uninsured and paying the penalty or being insured and paying the premium.
64
7 CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I study insurance-induced moral hazard using a dynamic model of
within-year medical care consumption. An individual’s optimization problem is defined by
an annual health insurance decision, followed by a sequence of monthly medical care con-
sumption decisions made over the course of a health insurance year. The within-year dynamic
structure stands in contrast to existing work that examines the relationship between health in-
surance and medical care demand by aggregating medical care decisions up to an annual level.
The disaggregated model of decision making more accurately describes the data generating
process by allowing medical care consumption to alter future health outcomes, assuming
medical care prices are unknown prior to consumption, and allowing for uncertainty about
future within-year medical care price and health outcomes.
The effect of moral hazard on total annual medical care expenditure is calculated by simu-
lating individuals’ behavior under various insurance conditions. There are two main findings.
First, the within-year model produces a moral hazard effect that is 24% larger than an alter-
native model that imposes the more restrictive assumptions of a typical annual expenditure
model. Ultimately, the presence of uncertainty at the time of medical care consumption in
the within-year decision-making model decreases the expected value of medical care con-
sumption. The larger moral hazard effect is driven by low medical care consumption when
uninsured, as risk averse individuals who face uncertainty are exposed to significant risk in
consumption. Second, I find heterogeneous moral hazard effects across the population. Of
importance to policy makers is that insured individuals are found to be much more respon-
sive to coverage than uninsured individuals (96% vs. 55% increase in spending in response
to coverage, respectively).
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This research advances the economic literature on insurance-induced moral hazard by al-
lowing for dynamic within-year incentives and uncertainty in a model of health insurance
and medical care consumption decisions; however, this research could also benefit from ad-
ditional data that would allow for the modeling of additional supply and demand side out-
comes/behaviors. Supplementing the medical care consumption information that I observe
with data on recommended courses of treatment for illnesses would allow one to disentangle
the roles of doctors and patients in the medical care decision-making process. Furthermore,
observing all employees within a firm (i.e., risk pools) may allow for insurance premiums to
be determined in equilibrium, which would allow one to study how new insurance alternative
sets affect insurance take-up, premiums, and medical care expenditure. These extensions are
interesting both theoretically and empirically and are left for future work.
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A APPENDIX: CHARTS AND TABLES
Table A.1: Representativeness of the Sample
Whole Sample Estimation Sample
mean s.d. mean s.d.
age 36.88 12.21 39.56 11.70
education (highest grade completed) 13.40 2.53 13.62 2.46
income (in 1996 dollars) 30985.62 21432.55 33713.84 21953.46
male 0.53 * 0.48 *
lives in a MSA 0.84 * 0.83 *
Hispanic 0.14 * 0.12 *
black 0.16 * 0.14 *
federal employee 0.03 * 0.09 *
northeast 0.19 * 0.19 *
midwest 0.24 * 0.25 *
south 0.35 * 0.34 *
west 0.22 * 0.22 *
excellent health status 0.34 * 0.32 *
good health status 0.35 * 0.35 *
poor health status 0.31 * 0.33 *
total annual expenditure † 1490.37 4033.53 1636.53 3063.95
insured all year 0.81 * 0.91 *
Sample Size 4859 1232
† This expenditure level was take directly from the MEPS data and includes types of medical care spending not included
in this analysis (e.g., dental and eye care, home healthcare, medical equipment, etc.).
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Table A.2: Structural Price Parameter Estimates
Doctor Price Hospital Price Prescription Price
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Price
constant 4.2338 0.0695 6.0503 0.0315 4.4014 0.0608
male 0.0243 0.0189 0.0508 0.0537 -0.2485 0.0169
non-white (black or Hispanic) -0.1183 0.0357 0.0061 0.0541 -0.0316 0.0155
education (highest grade completed) -0.0338 0.0051 -0.0031 0.0165 0.0115 0.0035
age 0.0015 0.0011 0.0089 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0006
lives in a MSA 0.1207 0.0299 0.1294 0.1229 -0.0819 0.0173
income (in 1996 dollars) 0.0033 0.0006 0.0079 0.0041 0.0013 0.0004
March/April (indicator) 0.1841 0.0464 0.3457 0.1476 -0.0566 0.0329
May/June (indicator) 0.2524 0.0475 0.3244 0.1317 -0.1490 0.0329
July/August (indicator) 0.1513 0.0449 0.0075 0.0922 -0.1877 0.0340
September/October (indicator) 0.1204 0.0437 0.5808 0.1897 -0.1458 0.0327
November/December (indicator) 0.1330 0.0487 0.2732 0.1787 -0.0339 0.0251
HMO -0.0856 0.0273 0.3182 0.1366 -0.1341 0.0149
PPO -0.0195 0.0206 -0.0017 0.0205 0.0916 0.0258
no insurance 0.1237 0.0501 -0.7416 0.1593 -0.2526 0.0339
acute illness 0.0398 0.0254 -0.1495 0.1035 0.1290 0.0166
chronic illness 0.0072 0.0282 -0.2108 0.1289 0.2459 0.0220
less than excellent health status 0.4736 0.0480 -0.0130 0.0163 -0.1186 0.0356
less than good health status -0.3800 0.0311 0.8883 0.1240 0.2674 0.0263
gamma shape parameter 1.2102 0.0204 0.5761 0.0371 2.0456 0.0226
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Table A.3: Initial Condition Probability Parameter Estimates
Health Status Acute Illness Chronic Illness
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Initial Condition
constant -1.1315 0.5323 -0.1575 0.7045 -2.4117 0.8227
male 0.3068 0.1369 -0.7126 0.1713 -0.5525 0.1859
non-white (black or Hispanic) -0.2747 0.1444 -0.4252 0.1814 -0.2691 0.2125
education (highest grade completed) 0.0795 0.0292 0.0093 0.0374 0.0854 0.0428
age -0.0204 0.0060 0.0032 0.0123 0.0585 0.0139
lives in a MSA 0.1176 0.1681 0.0568 0.2023 -0.1542 0.2340
income (in 1996 dollars) 0.0086 0.0043 0.0007 0.0053 0.0001 0.0055
March/April (indicator) 0.0860 0.2652 -0.5090 0.3144 * *
May/June (indicator) -0.0447 0.1978 -0.1933 0.3487 * *
July/August (indicator) -0.0163 0.2538 0.0248 0.2183 * *
September/October (indicator) -0.0756 0.2683 -0.4642 0.3147 * *
November/December (indicator) * * * * * *
less than excellent health status * * 0.3630 0.3722 0.1831 0.4490
less than good health status * * 0.1765 0.3985 0.5640 0.5103
less than excellent health status*age * * 0.0014 0.0157 0.0137 0.0195
less than good health status*age * * -0.0019 0.0159 -0.0053 0.0207
last year income 0.0459 0.0423 0.0167 0.0528 0.0569 0.0590
last year income missing -0.0378 0.2854 -0.0395 0.3608 -0.0130 0.4043
veteran (indicator) -0.1452 0.2242 0.2579 0.2765 -0.3692 0.3200
foreign born (indicator) 0.0406 0.2272 0.3385 0.2622 -0.6485 0.3189
cut-point 1.5432 0.0791 * * * *
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Table A.4: Closing Function Structural Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate SE
Closing Funtion
doctor visits γ0 -0.1180 0.1220
hospital days γ1 0.4559 0.3368
Rx consumption γ2 -0.4420 0.2912
doctor visits2 γ3 0.0154 0.0130
hospital days2 γ4 -0.0102 0.0105
doctor visits*Rx consumption γ5 0.0265 0.0391
doctor visits*hospital days γ6 -0.1135 0.0812
hospital days*Rx consumption γ7 -0.0032 0.0369
doctor visits*age γ8 0.0012 0.0042
hospital days*age γ9 -0.0366 0.0161
Rx consumption*age γ10 0.0101 0.0131
acute illness γ11 -30.4658 6.7544
chronic illness† γ12 -200.0000 *
less than excellent health status γ13 -57.5097 7.6595
less than good health status γ14 -64.9785 7.4035
† Parameter is not currently estimated.
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B APPENDIX: DATA OVERVIEW
The empirical exercises included in this research use data from the first four cohorts
(1996-1999) of the Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is collected by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The within-year model requires
the following information for each individual in the estimation sample: a set of employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESHI) plans (this includes the cost-sharing features of every
plan), an insurance decision, a general set of demographic variables, and two-years of med-
ical care consumption decisions, medical care prices, and health/illness identifiers. Most of
these variables cannot be taken directly from the survey, but must be constructed from a set
of responses. Furthermore, as is with any large longitudinal data set, many individuals are
missing pieces of information because they skipped an interview or failed to answer a partic-
ular survey question. In some studies this missing variable problem can be handled by simply
dropping individuals from analysis, but with an already limited sample dropping more in-
dividuals due to missing variables is not possible here. Therefore, this section serves two
purposes. First, it details the construction of variables used in estimation from the raw data.
Second, it explains the various data cleaning methods employed to strategically fill missing
variable values for the individuals in the estimation sample.
B.1 Demographic Variables
Individuals are first described by the following demographic variables, which are assumed
to be exogenous and time-invariant in estimation: sex, age, education (years of school com-
pleted), income, race (categorized as white or non-white), and MSA (categorized as living
in an MSA or not). Sample inclusion requires that individuals are employed and single (not
married and without children). Also, exclusion restrictions are needed to estimate endoge-
nous initial conditions; these are taken from the previous years National Health Interview
Survey (henceforth NHIS, which is the survey from which MEPS participants are drawn) and
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include: prior year income, veteran status, and country of birth (categorized as foreign born
or not).
Sex, age, race, employment, and MSA status can be taken directly from the data without
explanation. Education is taken from the first interview. Later interviews are used if the first
interview response is missing.78 Income is the sum of post-tax income, sale earnings, and
tax refund (ttlpnx, salepnx, refdpnx). AHRQ provide a cleaned version of these variables
with imputations. Individuals self-identify as married (marry31x) and I assume separated
individuals are not married.79 Parents are identified by other persons living in the household
(who are under 19 if non-student or under 24 if student), who identify them as mom or dad
(mopid31x, dapid31x).
Veteran Status can be extracted directly from NHIS survey data in 1995 and 1996 (cor-
responding to 1996 and 1997 MEPS participants). In 1997 and 1998, a veteran question
is not asked directly but can be inferred from the question “have you ever been honorably
discharged” (miltryds) and from VA medical care coverage information (hikindf, hikindg).80
Foreign born status can be taken directly from the data in each year. Previous year income is
measured on a 1-8 scale, as shown on the following page.
Income is missing for 33% of the NHIS population, so I use a missing indicator in es-
timation. Furthermore, of the 1233 individuals in the estimation sample, only 1179 can be
linked to NHIS. Those not matched are new members or previously absent members of NHIS
participating households. Of those linked, only 3 are missing foreign born status and 11 are
missing veteran status. These individuals and those not linked, are assumed to be native born,
non-veterans.
78Two individuals never report an exact number of years of education; however, they report some college so
14 years of education is assumed.
79The marriage condition is meant to eliminate individuals considering family insurance coverage. Separated
individuals are considered not married because (I assume) they make individual insurance decisions. If any of
these separated individuals hold family coverage then they are dropped from the sample.
80An individual is assumed to be a veteran if miltrydc = 1 OR hikindf = 1 & age > 18 & male = 1 OR
hikindg = 1 & age > 18 & male = 1.
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1 0-5k
2 5-10k
3 10-15k
4 15-20k
5 20-25k
6 25-35k
7 35-45k
8 45k+
B.2 Insurance Offer Set
A requirement for sample inclusion is that individuals are offered ESHI and that they
choose to be continuously insured (by an ESHI plan with no switching and no other coverage)
or uninsured over a 12 month period. Evidence of an insurance offer can be found in both
the employment section (offer31x) and insurance section (hpemmyy). When these variables
contradict, I assume the individual receives an offer as they are later removed if the offer is
not observed in the IC-Link file. Monthly insurance status (insured or not) can be determined
in the main HC data file (insmmyy). A series of insurance provider type variables in the HC
file ensures that the individual is not covered by an additional non-ESHI plan. Information in
the Person-Round-Plan file identifies individuals switching ESHI plans during the insurance
year and those holding multiple ESHI plans.
In the model, an individual selects a health insurance plan from a set of options offered
by his employer. Estimation requires data describing the premium and cost-sharing features
of both accepted and offered plans. The fact that MEPS collects such data is one of the two
main reasons that it is used in this research.81 From 1996-1999 and again in 2001, informa-
tion about an employee’s insurance offer set was gathered from his employer following the
first interview.82 This insurance information is contained in the confidential MEPS IC file.
81The other critical characteristic of the MEPS data is that it provides information about health and medical
care consumption within the insurance year.
82There was one significant change to the collection process that took place after 1996. The 1996 MEPS asked
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Using a Census Research Data Center (RDC), the IC file was linked with public individual
level data (MEPS HC file) to form the file used in estimation. Unfortunately, about 56%
of the individuals in the HC file meeting sample inclusion criteria for this research did not
have plans included in the IC File and were therefore dropped from the estimation sample.83
Among the individuals remaining, many have insurance offer sets featuring plans with miss-
ing characteristics. At least 1 of the 12 insurance cost-sharing features is missing in 47% of
the plans observed in the data. The remainder of this section discusses the strategies I use fill
these missing values.
Before describing these imputation strategies, it is important to understand that variation
in the structure of health insurance plans (specifically, variation in the use of cost-sharing
features) is the most significant contributor to missing plan features. For example, some
plans simply do not have a deductible, which is the same as having a zero deductible. In
completing the survey, some firms skipped the deductible question when the plan did not
have a deductible, rather than filling in a zero value. As such, the data often cannot distinguish
between a skipped question and a plan without a particular cost-sharing feature.84
B.2.1 Logical Imputation
I begin this exercise with a series of logical imputations which are informed by the ob-
served features of an insurance plan.
1. If no deductible is listed and it is stated that the plan has no deductible, then a zero
each employer specific questions regarding their participating employee. This method caused many employees
to refuse to provide their employers information as employees wished to remain anonymous. The method also
troubled employers because it was much more difficult to provide information about a particular employee
than employees in general (legalities also made employers weary of providing employee specific information).
Therefore, from 1997 on, the collection process was altered such that employers were only asked general infor-
mation about their insurance offerings. AHRQ then used a matching procedure to identify which offered plan
was reportedly chosen by employees. Note also that my analysis does not use year 2001 because data collector
did not gather information on the month a plan year started, which is critical when taking the data to the model.
83See Section 4 and Table 4.1 for a discussion on potential bias introduced by this exclusion.
84There is actually a separate question asking whether or not the plan had a deductible, but many plans are
missing this information as well. Therefore, I use the “does this plan have a deductible” information when
possible, but it cannot be consistently relied upon.
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deductible is coded. If it is indicated that the plan has a deductible, but no deductible
value is recorded, then I note this information and use it later. If the response to the
“does this plan have a deductible” question is missing then the deductible value is left
missing until later.
2. There are three hospital coverage variables (co-insurance, daily co-pay, and per-stay
co-pay). If any of these three is given a positive value, then I assume the others (if
missing values) do not apply.
3. There are two doctor coverage variables (co-insurance and co-pay). If either of these is
given a positive value, then I assume the other (if missing values) does not apply.
4. If a hospital co-pay value is recorded, but per-day/per-stay is not stated, then I assume
co-pay greater than 100 is per-stay and less than 100 is per-day.
5. If the stop loss is coded as zero (meaning comprehensive coverage), but the plan fea-
tures some cost-sharing, then I recode the stop loss to be missing.
6. If hospital and doctor care is free after the deductible is crossed then I set the stop loss
equal to the stated deductible.
The scope of the missing information problem after these assumptions can be observed
below. I list the number of plans with any missing piece of information by whether or not
the plan is held. Plans are flagged if missing out-of-pocket premium, deductible, hospital
coverage, doctor coverage, or stop loss. Total premium and plan type (HMO, PPO, or FFS)
are never missing in the data. Also, note that for many of these missing characteristics I can
determine whether or not the plan characteristic exists (e.g., that the plan has a deductible),
just not what the true value is.
Declined Plan Held Plan Total
No missing features 2,495 434 2,929
Missing features 1,958 706 2,664
Total 4,453 1,140 5,593
Next, I use observed expenditure information in the data to infer missing cost-sharing
features of held plans. MEPS collects not only charge and total expenditure data, but also
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out-of-pocket and insurer payment for each medical care episode. This information can be
used at times to determine deductible levels and doctor/hospital cost-sharing arrangements
for held plans only. For example: If a plan begins in January and every trip to the doctor’s
office over the course of the year cost the individual $5 out-of-pocket, then I can impute that
the individual had no deductible and a $5 co-pay at the doctor. In the spirit of full disclosure,
imputation is rarely this easy for a number of reasons; many plans have different cost-sharing
characteristics in and out of network, people may not recall the price paid out-of-pocket,
and some individuals simply do not pay their medical bills. As such, some subjectivity is
necessary to execute this procedure.
I also use this step to exclude some individuals and plans from the final sample. First, I
eliminate individuals with large amounts of medical care spending information that cannot
possibly be generated under their current coverage. Second, I remove redundant plans, or
plans within a specific individuals offer set that are exactly the same according to the model’s
characterization of insurance or differ only by start month. After removing these redundant
plans and making the imputations described above, the number of plans with missing charac-
teristics is as follows:
Declined Plan Held Plan Total
No missing features 2,398 485 2,883
Missing features 1,847 641 2,488
Total 4,245 1,126 5,371
B.2.2 Matching Method
After the logical edits described above, I turn to more traditional imputation techniques. I
first use a matching procedure that fills in missing insurance characteristics with those of plans
matching on observable characteristics. To execute this procedure, I first order all 7028 plans
in the original IC-Link file by total premium and network type. I then categorize each plan by
its missing characteristics (e.g., missing nothing, missing deductible only, missing deductible
and doctor coverage, etc.). Beginning with the plans missing the fewest characteristics, I fill
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in missing information using values from similar plans where the variable is observed. There
are 6 rounds of matching, where the level of “similarity” required for a match is relaxed
further in each round. The table below describes the bounds on an acceptable match in each
round.
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6
Total premium 0 0 25 25 50 50
Total deductible 0 0 25 25 50 50
Doctor deductible 0 0 25 25 50 50
Hospital deductible 0 0 25 25 50 50
Doctor co-pay 0 0 5 5 10 10
Doctor co-insurance 0 0 5 5 10 10
Hospital co-insurance 0 0 5 5 10 10
Hospital daily co-pay 0 0 10 10 20 20
Hospital stay co-pay 0 0 25 25 50 50
Stop loss 0 0 150 150 300 300
Plan type 0 0 0 0 0 0
In order to match, every characteristics of the matched plan must fall within the appropri-
ate characteristic bounds centered at the observed characteristics of the plan with some piece
of missing information. For example: assume plan A is missing all deductible information,
but has values for all other plan characteristics. Further, assume these characteristics are as
follows:
• Total premium: 500
• Doctor co-pay: 10
• Doctor co-insurance: none
• Hospital co-insurance: 10
• Hospital co-pay (day): none
• Hospital co-pay (stay): none
• Stop loss: 1500
• Plan type: HMO
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In the first two search rounds, plan A would only be matched if it finds a plan with the
exact same characteristics described above.85 If a match is found then deductible, hospital
deductible, and doctor deductible information from the matched plan are recorded for plan
A. In the third and fourth rounds, plan A is matched if it can find a plan with characteristics
fitting in the following bounds:86
• Total premium: [475, 525]
• Doctor co-pay: [5, 15]
• Doctor co-insurance: [−5, 5]
• Hospital co-insurance: [5, 15]
• Hospital co-pay (day): [−10, 10]
• Hospital co-pay (stay): [−25, 25]
• Stop loss: [1350, 1650]
• Plan type: HMO
In each round all plans with missing information look for a match before moving on to
the next round. A summary of missing plans after the matching procedure can be seen below.
Declined Plan Held Plan Total
No missing features 3,973 924 4,897
Missing features 272 202 474
Total 4,245 1,126 5,371
85Only plans with no missing information are available for match. After the first round of matching, some
plans previously ineligible for match become eligible, which is why there are two rounds of matching for each
set of bounds.
86There are several notes to be made here. First, in every round, the plan types must match exactly. Second,
the out-of-pocket premium is not used as a criteria for matching because it varies across employers, meaning it
has little to do with the commonality of plans in the marketplace. Third, in many instances, it can be assumed
with certainty (using other variables in the data) that a plan with a missing deductible (or stop loss) does in fact
have a non-zero deductible. In these cases, the match plan must have a non-zero deductible, in addition to the
restrictions described above.
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B.2.3 Regression Method
After using this matching technique, there are still 474 plans with missing information.
However, the existence of missing information here does not necessarily imply that the ob-
servable characteristics of these plans are outside the bounds of normalcy. Because the match-
ing procedure requires similarity in every observable characteristic, it is possible that a plan
missing only 1 characteristic, with all other observed characteristics at the sample mean, may
not find a match simply because that combination of features is not seen in another plan.
I turn to regression methods to determine missing values for the remaining plans. To
reduce the number of regressions required, I assume that all remaining plans are defined
by the most popular insurance structure, meaning doctor and hospital specific deductibles,
hospital co-pay, and doctor co-insurance are ruled out. I begin by estimating whether or not
a plan has a stop loss.87 The regression includes all plans reporting a stop loss and those
reporting that the plan has no stop loss. These parameters are used to predict the presence
of a stop loss for plans where it cannot be determined if a stop loss exists. I then use an
OLS regression of stop loss on other plan and company characteristics to predict a stop loss
for those known (either through the data or through the previously described prediction) to
have one, but no recorded value.88 The same procedure is followed for the deductible; a logit
for any deductible and an OLS regression to predict the level. Hospital co-insurance, doctor’s
office co-pay, and out-of-pocket premium equations are all estimating using Tobit models and
missing values are replaced with appropriate predictions.
87For this regression and all other dichotomous outcomes I estimate logit parameters.
88Each regression uses the following set of explanatory variables: total premium, has deductible, deductible,
has stop loss, stop loss, hospital cost-sharing generosity, doctor’s office cost-sharing generosity, firm size, num-
ber of firm enrollees, federal plan indicator, year dummies, HMO, and PPO. I also use a number of missing
variable dummies that change across equations as information is filled in. Some variables must be removed
from this set so that they are not on the right and left hand side of the regression (e.g., stop loss is not included
on the right hand side of the stop loss regression).
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B.3 Medical Care Consumption
Survey participants report all medical care consumption that takes place during an inter-
view period. To the best of their ability, individuals provide the date and location of consump-
tion, illness treated, procedure performed, price charged, and the cost-sharing arrangement
with their insurance company. Given the length of time covered by an interview period and
the number of details associated with any consumption episode, the ability of individuals to
recall this information is questionable. To counteract the recall problem, survey administra-
tors contacted all reported medical facilities to verify as much information as possible.89 For
each medical care type, AHRQ provides both imputed (File 1) and non-imputed (File 2) data,
where the former contains episode level consumption variables that combine individual and
provider responses. I use File 1 in my analysis. Note that contacting providers increases the
reliability of all variables associated with particular visit, but individuals are relied upon en-
tirely to report visits. If they fail to report a particular visit, no medical provider is contacted
to verify their absence. The information below describes how I categorize reported medical
care consumption into specific types, how consumption units are priced, and how prescription
drug consumption dates are determined.
B.3.1 Medical Care Types and Pricing
MEPS classifies all medical care consumption into inpatient, outpatient, ER, office-based,
and prescription drug. For the purposes of this research, inpatient, outpatient, and ER visits
are all classified as hospital care. A single trip to the ER or single outpatient visit is equivalent
(in terms of consumption decision and price draw) to one day of an inpatient stay. An inpatient
stay of 5 days constitutes 5 separate decisions to consume medical care. Doctor visits are
89Contact with medical providers was made via telephone interview and mailed survey materials. Providers
were contacted for every consumption episode, except office-based visits. AHRQ only contacted office
providers if (1) the patient received Medicaid, (2) the household held a managed care plan and was selected
as part of a 75% random sample, or (3) the household did not hold an managed care plan or Medicare, but was
selected as part of a 25% random sample.
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straight-forward and prescription drug consumption is discussed at length in Section 4.3.
Medical care prices are observed in the data only when individual’s consume care. There-
fore, an individual only receives a price contribution to his likelihood function in months
when he chooses to consume.90 The medical care price information needed for the likelihood
contribution are taken directly from the data. The total price paid for medical care (insurer
payment plus insured payment) is used as the total price. If an individual consumes multiple
units of the same type of medical care in a month then the average price paid for that month
is used, as each individual can only have one price contribution per month.
There are two issues with the medical care pricing data that must be addressed. The first
issue is bundle pricing. At times, rather than pricing individual doctor visits or hospital days,
a price is set for a fixed number of visits or for general treatment of an ailment. This pricing
strategy is rarely seen in the data (283 of the 13,819 visits reported in the data are priced as
part of a bundle) but must be dealt with. I assume that all visits in the bundle are chosen
independently. If all visits in the bundle are of the same type (doctor or hospital) then I
assume that the price is spread out equally over each visit. If the consumption bundle consists
of both hospital days and doctor visits, then an 8/1 price ratio is assumed between hospital
and doctor prices, which is consistent with the price ratio observed among non-bundled visits.
The second issue is with observed medical care prices for the uninsured. It should be
the case that the list (charged) price is equal to the transaction (paid) price for all uninsured
individuals, but this is not the case. (See Section 3.4 for terminology.) At times, the unin-
sured negotiate directly with their doctors for lower payments or simply fail to pay a medical
bill, which is observed as zero payment in the data. If I were to use the payment amount
as the total price for medical care (for the uninsured), then the uninsured would face lower
90This data feature is similar to the labor literature, where wages are only observed for individuals who
choose to work. In the labor literature, an employment decision is included in estimation to control for the
endogeneity of wages (those who are likely to earn high wages are also likely to work). The model presented in
this dissertation controls for the endogeneity of prices (those who are likely to receive low price draws are also
likely to consume) by modeling a consumption decision and be allowing for permanent unobserved correlation
between the medical care preferences and price draws.
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average medical care prices than insured individuals. Left unchanged, these low prices would
incorrectly incentivize zero coverage in simulation. In theory, the model should include ne-
gotiation costs, medical care quality, and individual credit-scores, which would capture the
costs associated with the low payments of the uninsured; however, this would significantly
complicate the model. Instead, I use the list (charged) price as the total price for the uninsured
in estimation.
B.3.2 Consumption Dates
The dates of doctor visits and hospital days are consistently reported in the data (roughly
0.1% of visits are not accompanied by a date). For the few doctor visits and hospital days
that are missing a date, a month is selected at random from the appropriate interview period.
The dates of prescription drug consumption are much more difficult to extract from the data.
The model requires that I observe (in each month) whether or not any prescription drugs are
consumed and total drug spending. The goal is then to take from the data the beginning
and ending consumption months for each prescription, as well as the total amount spent
on each prescription over all consumption months. This total is divided evenly over the
consumption months. The prescription price each month used in the model is then the sum
of all prescription expenditures within the month.
The first month that a particular prescription is filled can be found in the data for most
drugs (73%). For those missing a date, I match the prescriptions to illnesses and medical
care consumption in the same interview period using ICD-9-CM codes.91 By assuming the
prescription drug is first taken in the month that the illness began or in the same month as
medical care consumption I can impute some prescription drug beginning dates (85% have a
beginning date after this assumption). For the remaining prescriptions, I use the number of
refills in each interview period and the beginning and ending months of each interview period
91Every illness and medical care consumption entry in the data file contains an ICD-9-CM condition code.
These codes are used throughout the data cleaning process to match consumption to illness and vice versa.
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to randomize a starting date between reasonable bounds.
The last month that a drug is taken is more difficult to determine. The interview period
containing each refill of a prescription can be found in the data; however, only the initial
fills are accompanied by an exact date. Thus, I know the date that each individual began
medication, the number of refills, and the interview periods the refills were purchased in.
Using this information and the quantity of each prescription (usually the number of pills and
strength of each pill), I approximate the number of months that each refill covers. For the
21 most popular drugs in the data set (see next page) I was able to use average dosage to
approximate the number of months.92 The approximation provided a length for 2,422 out of
the 13,592 total fills/refills purchased over the 2 year period.93
For less popular drugs, I use two methods for determining the last month that a drug
is taken. First, for drugs in which every refill is the same quantity and consumption spans
multiple interview periods, I use the average prescription length in periods prior to the last to
calculate an average refill length. I then apply the average length to refills in the last interview
period, which provides a length for 4234 additional fills/refills. For single prescription fills
and for drugs with non-constant refills (in terms of quantities of pills) I was advised by a
medical professional to make the following assumptions:
1. For prescriptions treating acute illnesses, assume prescriptions are for one month.
2. For prescriptions treating chronic illnesses with less than 90 pills, assume prescriptions
are for one month.
3. For prescriptions treating chronic illnesses with more than 90 pills or not in a pill form,
assume prescriptions are written for three months.
92Average dosage is taken from “Mosby’s: Pharmacology in Nursing.” All assumptions were verified by a
physician.
93This procedure (and others in this section) was done for all fills/refills over the 2 years that an individual
was interviewed, even though I only use 1 year of information in estimation. I begin with data covering two
years for several reasons. Most importantly, consumption of a prescription in the second year, which began in
the first year, tells me that the ending consumption date for that drug runs past the end of the year, providing a
solid ending date in the model. Also, because individuals all enter the sample in different months of the year
(whichever year their held plan beings) imputation is easier when all prescriptions over the two-year period are
analyzed.
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Drug Average Dosage
Birth Control Monthly packages of 21, 28, and 30 pills
Zoloft 50 - 150 mg/day
Zocor 5 - 10 mg/day
Zestril 10 - 40 mg/day
Vasotec 5 - 40 mg/day
Synthroid 0.125 - 0.5 mg/day
Prozac 10 - 40 mg/day
Premarin 0.3 - 1.25 mg/day
Paxil 20 - 50 mg/day
Naproxen 250 - 500 mg/day
Lotensin 5 - 40 mg/day
Glucophage 500 - 800 mg/2-3 times per day
Flonase 2 sprays/day
Claritin 10 mg/day
Atenolol 10 - 100 mg/day
Amoxicillin 500 - 800 mg/2-3 times per day
Toprol 25 - 100 mg/day (max 400)
Ranitidine 150 mg/2 times per day
Provera 5 - 10 mg/day
Norvasc 5 - 10 mg/day
Ibuprofen 300 - 800 mg/3-4 times per day
The first assumption is based on the fact that doctors rarely prescribe multi-month pre-
scriptions for acute illnesses. Such illnesses are curable; thus, if the illness continues for
more than a month after a prescription has been taken, it is likely that the illness has been
misdiagnosed, meaning other treatments need to be explored. The second and third assump-
tions result from several common prescribing practices. First, many insurance companies
set the maximum prescription size that they will cover for particular drugs at 30 or 90 days.
As such, 1 month and 3 month prescriptions have become standard prescription lengths for
physicians. Second, doctors rarely prescribe less than one pill per day because keeping up
with the medication schedule is difficult for patients. Third, longer prescriptions are often
prescribed for patients with chronic illnesses because the drug is meant to control the illness,
not cure it. Prescriptions are then written for longer periods of time with fewer check-ups
needed between refills.
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These assumptions provide a length for every fill/refill in the sample. These lengths are
then added together to make a total length for each prescription drug consumption episode.
To validate this technique, I review the ending month assigned to each drug to ensure that it
falls in the correct interview period (which is observed). The test results in a 90% success
rate. For those predicted to continue their prescription consumption beyond their last known
interview period where consumption was reported, interview beginning and ending months
and number of refills in the final period are used to randomly impute a more realistic ending
month.
B.4 Illness
In each interview individuals are asked to report all “health problems [experienced during
the current interview period] including physical conditions, accidents, or injuries that affect
any part of the body as well as mental or emotional health conditions, such as feeling sad,
blue, or anxious about something.” Participants are told explicitly to include ailments even
if they did not seek professional medical care. The individual’s description of the illness is
recorded as verbatim text, which is later coded to 5-digit ICD-9-CM codes by professional
coders. If an illness is identified during the interview as a “priority condition” then an ex-
panded set of questions is asked, including the exact date the illness began.94 In all interviews
after the first, participants are reminded of illnesses reported in prior interview periods and
are asked if the illness has “bothered” them since the beginning of the current interview pe-
riod. Therefore, I can determine the interview period in which the illness began and ended
for all non-priority conditions. For priority conditions, I can determine the exact month than
the illness began and the interview period in which it ended.
Before moving on to describe how illnesses are classified and how more precise illness
94Certain conditions were designated as priority conditions by AHRQ because their prevalence, expense, or
relevance to policy called for further inquiry. Some examples are cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, hypertension,
arthritis, stomach ulcers, and back problems. A full list can be found on the MEPS website.
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dates are determined, the likelihood of unreported illnesses should be considered. In addi-
tion to standard recall problems, these data do not contain undiagnosed illnesses. Individuals
cannot know about the presence of some illnesses, especially certain chronic illnesses (e.g.,
hypertension, breast cancer, heart disease, etc.), without the illness being identified by a doc-
tor. The model assumes that illnesses arrive as random (though endogenous) shocks, which
do not require a doctor to be identified. Empirically, the missingness of undiagnosed illnesses
may be problematic if those rarely seeking medical care, and therefore not being diagnosed,
appear healthier than they actually are.95 If the objective of this research were to study the
role of medical care consumption in determining health over the life course, then this issue of
undiagnosed illness would be especially concerning. Data that required participants to take
a physical examination, which would reduce the probability of undiagnosed illness, may be
more valuable for such an objective. However, the focus of this research is the measurement
of moral hazard within a single health insurance year. Endogenous health outcomes are mod-
eled to correct potential bias in moral hazard estimates, but correctly predicting long-term
health outcomes is not among the principle objectives. Therefore, for my purposes, the most
valuable measure of illness is the measure that an individual is aware of. In the short-run,
individuals are most influenced by the illnesses that they actually know they have.
B.4.1 Classification of ICD-9-CM Codes
To estimate the model, all illnesses must be categorized as acute or chronic. I classify
illnesses using the Chronic Condition Indicator (CCI) program, which identifies chronic ill-
nesses by 5-digit ICD-9-CM codes.96 For the purposes of this research, a chronic illness
differs from an acute illness in that it is assumed to never fully subside. The program defines
a chronic illness as “a condition that lasts 12 months or longer and meets one or both of the
95I thank Jessica Vistnes and Steven Hill of AHRQ for their thoughts and suggestions on this topic.
96The Chronic Condition Indicator was developed as part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(HCUP), which is sponsored by AHRQ.
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following tests: (a) it places limitations on self-care, independent living, and social interac-
tions; (b) it results in the need for ongoing intervention with medical products, services, and
special equipment.” I must then reclassify some of the illnesses observed in the data (see
below).97
A few of these changes require explanation.98 According to the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC), 16%, of individuals 14-49 have some form of the Herpes Simplex
virus (Genital Herpes), yet most do not know they have it. While it satisfies the definition
of chronic illness imposed by this research in that the disease cannot be fully eliminated, it
behaves like an acute illness. Infected individuals may experience outbreaks a few times a
year, but potentially not at all. During these episodes individuals use medical care to treat the
symptoms, but outside these outbreaks live normal lives. Furthermore, the rare occurrence
of this illness in the data suggest that the individuals only report the virus during an out-
break, meaning it is also reported as an acute illness. Carpel Tunnel syndrome is coded as an
acute illness because treatment (splint, physical therapy, or surgery) can restore the wrist to
full health. The other respiratory disease recode applied to only one individual, who reports
having had this disease for 15 years.99
97This list is not an exhaustive list of all ICD-9-CM codes that should be reclassified given the difference in
chronic illness definitions. The illnesses listed here are only the observed illnesses that need to be changed.
98None of these assumptions are likely to have a large impact in estimation. Each of these changes affects
fewer than 25 individuals, except Acute reaction to stress and Chronic Sinusitis, which still affect fewer than 75
individuals.
99Other notes: For the purposes of this research, near/far sightedness and astigmatism are not considered
illnesses though they appear frequently in the condition files. Only 198 of the 6208 reported medical conditions
are missing an ICD-9-CM code. For these individuals, I look at medical care consumption in the same periods
to try to infer what the illness was. If there is no medical care consumption in the period and the illness is
present in every period over the two year span, I assume that it is a chronic illness. Otherwise, I assume that it
is an acute illness.
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ICD-9-CM Illness Changed to
054 Herpes Simplex Acute
239 Unspecified cancer Chronic
308 Acute reaction to stress Acute
309 Adjustment reaction Acute
354 Carpel Tunnel Acute
360 Disorder of the globe Acute
436 Acute Cerebrovascular Disease Acute
473 Chronic Sinusitis Acute
474 Chronic disease of the tonsils and
adenoids
Acute
519 Other respiratory disease Chronic
562 Diverticula of the intestines Acute
625 Premenstrual Syndrome Acute
730 Unspecified Osteomyelitis Acute
V10 Past cancer Chronic
B.4.2 Illness Beginning and Ending Dates
The model requires that the data reveal whether or not an individual has an acute illness
and chronic illness in each of the 12 months of the insurance year. To determine this infor-
mation, I need to know the beginning and ending month of each reported illness. For every
illness reported in the data, it can be determined in which interview period the illness began
and ended, but not necessarily the month. Thus, in what follows, I describe the procedures
used to impute the beginning and ending month for each illness. I begin with a few simpli-
fying assumptions. First, all congenital diseases observed in the data are assumed to begin
prior to the beginning of the insurance year.100 Second, I assume that all illnesses reported
in consecutive interview periods represent one continuous illness. Furthermore, throughout
the file there are examples of the same illness being reported multiple times by the same in-
dividual with gaps in reporting (e.g., had illness during 1st and 3rd interview). At times, it is
reasonable to assume that the multiple records describe one continuous illness. Most of the
time, it is unlikely that the illness lasted 6 or 7 months, so it is best assumed that the illness
100I observe the following ICD-9-CM codes: 747, 753, 755, 757, 758, 759.
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occurred on two separate occasions (e.g., a common cold). I resolve these issues case by
case. In total, there are 414 instances where a gap rule is needed (two entries for the same
illness and an interview gap between reports). Rules are generally made at the illness level
(e.g., any gap for a common cold implies two illnesses, for which there are 100). After these
edits, I observe 5586 independent illnesses for the estimation sample over the 2 year period
of study. I add to these illnesses 37 illness records that are necessary to match medical care
consumption information (e.g., I observe that an individual takes insulin in every month but
has no record of diabetes). I then remove redundant illnesses, or multiple records of illnesses
that last the exact same amount of time and likely describe the same ailment (e.g., if I observe
an individual with diarrhea and a stomach ache in the same interview period, I drop one of
these records).101 I also remove any illness known to begin after the end of the insurance year.
This step reduces the number of illnesses to 4,482.
Of these illnesses, 29% are classified by AHRQ as “priority conditions” (mostly chronic
and important acute illnesses), so the month that the illness began is known. A beginning date
must be imputed for the remaining illnesses. To aid in imputation, I first assume that if the
individual consumed medical care for an illness in the first interview period that an illness is
reported, then the month of consumption is the month that the illness began. This assumption
is equivalent to assuming that people do not wait more than a month to go to the doctor if
they are going to go at all. After this assumption, 1,299 illnesses are in need of a beginning
month. For these, a beginning date is drawn uniformly between the first and last month of
the interview where the illness was first reported. For the first interview period, I account
for the fact that the illness may have begun prior to the start of the year. This randomization
procedure results in 302 illnesses having start dates that are past the end of the insurance year.
101Most of instances of redundant illnesses result from multiple symptoms of an illness being reported as
an actual illness. Removing redundant illnesses relieves some of the burden of imputation. The model does
not distinguish between 1 and 2 acute illnesses in a month, so even if I were to keep both illness records the
information would eventually be condensed. However, dropping a record means I do not have to determine a
starting and ending date for the illness.
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They are dropped and 4,180 illnesses remain.
Illness ending months are more difficult to extract because they are never observed ex-
plicitly. I only observe the last interview period in which an illness was reported. Fortunately,
chronic illnesses are assumed to never end, so only acute illnesses need an approximated end-
ing month. Further, many acute illnesses begin during the 12 months of the insurance year
but end in an interview period after the close of the insurance year, meaning no ending month
is required for the model. Thus, only 2,592 illnesses need an ending date. Randomization is
not necessary for 343 illnesses because they start and end in the same interview period and
the beginning date is the last month of the period. There are then only 2,249 illnesses that
need an ending month to be imputed. For these, I draw an ending month at random from the
interview period that the illness reportedly ended in. If an illness ends in the same interview
period that it begans, the lower bound is set to the beginning month.102 The distribution of
bound lengths is shown below.
Bound
Length
Frequency Cumulative
Percentage
1 355 15.8%
2 437 35.2%
3 391 52.6%
4 368 69.0%
5 371 85.5%
6 197 94.2%
7 101 98.7%
8 29 100.0%
Total 2249
102The lower bound could be increased (decreasing the draw range) by setting it equal to the month of last
corresponding consumption in the last interview period that the illness was reported. I did not use this strategy
because it almost certainly would have lead estimates to reflect medical care as harmful for ones health, as those
consuming medical care would on average have longer illness periods than others. With the method used, the
productivity of medical care is identified by the data alone. If medical care helps an individual avoid illness in
the following interview period, then it is productive. If it does not, then medical care may be harmful.
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C APPENDIX: OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURE EQUATION
Out-of-pocket expenditure resulting from vt trips to the doctor, st hospital days, and con-
suming prescription drugs rt in month t can be calculated as a function of accumulated out-
of-pocket doctor’s office expenditure entering the month, ADEt; accumulated out-of-pocket
hospital expenditure entering the month, AHEt; the month t total price of a doctor’s office
visit, hospital days, and prescription drug consumption, pvt , p
s
t , and p
r
t respectively; and the
cost-sharing features of one’s insurance plan. The cost-sharing features that may impact the
out-of-pocket cost of care are
• Dd1 = doctor’s office specific deductible
• Dh1 = hospital specific deductible
• D2 = stop loss
• Cd1 = doctor’s office co-insurance rate
• Cd2 = doctor’s office co-pay level
• Ch1 = hospital co-insurance rate
• Ch12 = hospital co-pay level defined by day
• Ch22 = hospital co-pay level defined by stay
• C3 = prescription drug co-insurance level
To ensure that the out-of-pocket cost of an additional unit of care is captured regardless of
the unique combination of insurance features a plan contains, I categorize each plan into one
of four general types and allow different pieces of the function below to change depending
on the plan type. These four types are
• Type 1: composite deductible (or no deductible at all) and hospital co-pay defined by
day (or hospital co-pay does not at all exist).
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• Type 2: composite deductible (or no deductible at all) and hospital co-pay defined by
stay.
• Type 3: separate deductible(s) and hospital co-pay defined by day (or hospital co-pay
does not at all exist).
• Type 4: separate deductible(s) and hospital co-pay defined by stay.
The strategy for calculating out-of-pocket expenditure is to separately determine the amount
of pre-deductible and post-deductible expenditure first for doctor visits and then for hospital
days. Doctor and hospital expenditure must be derived separately because the cost-sharing
features of nearly every plan require individuals to pay a different proportion of the total
cost for each service. Two assumptions are needed to calculate out-of-pocket expenditure
each month. First, it is assumed that the total price charged for a doctor visit and the total
price charged for a hospital day are fixed for an individual within any month. This assumption
makes the problem empirically tractable. As mentioned, an individual solves his optimization
problem by integrating over three distributions of possible prices. If this price were allowed
to vary for each trip to the doctor/hospital in a month, then a V ∗ S dimensional integral
would need to be solved in every month. Further, given that the factors influencing the total
prices one faces in a month are not changing, it seems reasonable to assume that the total
price does not change. Second, the equation assumes that all doctor visits within a month are
made before any hospital decisions take place. While this assumption is clearly not ideal, it is
necessary if one hopes to avoid modeling the specific order in which an individual decides to
visit the doctor and hospital, which would cause the size of the alternative set to explode.103
Conditional on these assumptions, out-of-pocket expenditure can be calculated as follows:
103Order is important because it determines when exactly during the month the deductible or stop loss is
passed. Alternatives to this assumption are: (1) Force an individual to select not only the number of visits but
the order as well; however, this is likely to be empirically infeasible. (2) Stipulate that non-linear changes in
medical care prices that happen when one crosses the deductible or stop loss only occur between months, which
would greatly simplify the budget constraint; however, it would remove important variation from the data.
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Pre-deductible spending on doctor’s office care is:
o1dt (vt, p
v
t ,Ψt) =

pvt ∗ vt if 0 ≤ pvt ∗ vt ≤ x1t
x1t if 0 ≤ x1t < pvt ∗ vt
(C.1)
where
Type 1: x1t = composite deductible remaining = max{0, D1 − ADEt − AHEt}
Type 2: x1t = composite deductible remaining = max{0, D1 − ADEt − AHEt}
Type 3: x1t = doctor deductible remaining = max{0, Dd1 − ADEt}
Type 4: x1t = doctor deductible remaining = max{0, Dd1 − ADEt}
Post-deductible spending on doctor visits is:
o2dt (vt, p
v
t ,Ψt) =

overdt if over
d
t ≤ z1t
overdt − z1t if overdt > z1t
(C.2)
where
overdt =max
{
0, int
{
(pvt ∗ vt)− x1t
pvt
}
∗ Cd2
}
+
max
{
0, (pvt ∗ vt)− x1t − int
{
(pvt ∗ vt)− x1t
pvt
}
Cd2
}
∗ Cd1
z1t = stop loss remaining = max
{
0, D2 − ADEt − AHEt − o1dt
}
Total amount spent out-of-pocket on doctor visits in month t is:
Odt = o
1d
t + o
2d
t (C.3)
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Conditional on month t doctor spending, pre-deductible spending on hospital care is:
o1ht (st, p
s
t ,Ψt) =

pst ∗ st if 0 ≤ pst ∗ st ≤ x2t
x2t if 0 ≤ x2t < pst ∗ st
(C.4)
where
Type 1: x2t = composite deductible remaining = max{0, D1−ADEt−AHEt−Odt }
Type 2: x2t = composite deductible remaining = max{0, D1−ADEt−AHEt−Odt }
Type 3: x2t = hospital deductible remaining = max{0, Dh1 − AHEt}
Type 4: x2t = hospital deductible remaining = max{0, Dh1 − AHEt}
Post-deductible spending on hospital care is:
o2ht (st, p
s
t ,Ψt) =

overht if over
h
t ≤ z2t
overht − z2t if overht > z2t
(C.5)
where
z2t = stop loss remaining = max{0, D2 − ADEt − AHEt −Odt − o1ht }
A = int
(
(pst∗st)−x2t
pst
)
, where int(w) rounds w to the nearest integer
Type 1: overht =max
{
0, A ∗ Ch12
}
+
max
{
0, (pst ∗ st)− x2t − A ∗ Ch12
} ∗ Ch1
Type 2: overht =max
{
0,min{(pst ∗ st)− x2t , Ch22 }
}
+
max
{
0, (pst ∗ st)− x2t − Ch22
} ∗ Ch1
Type 3: overht =max
{
0, A ∗ Ch12
}
+
max
{
0, (pst ∗ st)− x2t − A ∗ Ch12
} ∗ Ch1
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Type 4: overht =max
{
0,min{(pst ∗ st)− x2t , Ch22 }
}
+
max
{
0, (pst ∗ st)− x2t − Ch22
} ∗ Ch1
The total amount spent out-of-pocket on hospital care in month t is:
Oht = o
1
th+ o
2
th (C.6)
Out-of-pocket expenditure in month t is:
Ot = O
d
t +O
h
t + (rt ∗ prt ∗ C3) (C.7)
Accumulated doctor and hospital expenditure entering month t+ 1 is:
ADEt+1 =

ADEt +O
d
t if t > 0
0 if t = 0
(C.8)
AHEt+1 =

AHEt +O
h
t if t > 0
0 if t = 0
(C.9)
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D APPENDIX: WELFARE EXPERIMENTS
Until now, this manuscript has focused on how medical care expenditure responds to
various sequences of medical care prices, which are caused by different health insurance
cost-sharing structures. While this relationship between insurance and expenditure is inter-
esting for policy-makers, little has been said about the impact that insurance has on welfare,
which is of greater interest to economists. In this section, I discuss the (consumer) welfare
implications of insurance possession for individuals in my estimation sample under the in-
surance environment observed in the data. I also explore several ways in which the insurance
environment may be altered in order to improve consumer welfare.
D.1 The Welfare Implications of Insurance Possession
The purpose of health insurance is to protect risk averse individuals from the financial
risk associated with negative health shocks. If medical care consumption were unaffected
by insurance possession, this risk protection would yield a welfare gain. However, because
insurance decreases the financial disincentive of medical care consumption (by lowering the
price), insurance encourages medical care consumption to increase (known as moral hazard).
Therefore, if the level of medical care consumption without insurance (when individuals pay
the full price of medical care) is socially optimal, then the additional consumption induced
by insurance is welfare reducing. Furthermore, the welfare gains from risk protection and
the welfare losses from overconsumption are inversely related. Any plan providing more
financial protection, by lowering an individual’s out-of-pocket price of care, at the same time
encourages more over-consumption. The socially optimal level of insurance coverage must
then balance the trade-off between welfare gains from risk protection and welfare losses from
moral hazard (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968).
Several researchers have estimated the relative size of these effects, all conditioning on the
important assumption that the level of medical care consumption without insurance is socially
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optimal (Feldstein 1973; Feldman and Dowd 1991; Feldstein and Gruber 1995; Manning and
Marquis 1996; Finkelstein and McKnight 2008; Kowalski 2013). The assumption is strict,
as it requires that there are no externalities from the additional medical care consumption
induced by insurance (e.g., the reduction of communicable diseases) and that medical care
prices in a market without insurance are competitive. While I find each of these requirements
troubling, a richer economic model than the one presented in this research is needed in order
to relax them. Therefore, I discuss below how to calculate the welfare gains from risk protec-
tion and the welfare losses from moral hazard assuming that consumption when uninsured is
socially optimal. While more work must be done to relax this critical assumption, this is the
first unified model of within-year medical care behavior and health transitions that is able to
estimate these effects of insurance possession. Given my hesitance to accept the underlying
assumptions, I explain the procedure but do not actually calculate the welfare effects.
D.1.1 Welfare Gains from Risk Protection
Calculating the welfare gains from risk protection using this model is easier than calcu-
lating the welfare losses from moral hazard, so I discuss it first. Insurance serves to protect
individuals from financial risk, not the risk of a poor health shock. In the model, individuals
make medical care consumption decisions by integrating over three price distributions. In-
surance improves welfare by limiting the individual’s exposure to these price distributions;
intuitively, insurance truncates the right tails of these distributions. The welfare gains from
risk protection can then be calculated as the willing to pay for insurance, where the benefit of
insurance is limited to the relative gain in within period expected utility due to the truncated
price distributions.104
Therefore, in order to use this model to calculate the welfare gains from risk protection
for an individual i, one would first simulate the model for all individuals under no insurance.
104The relevant welfare gain is in expected utility, and not realized utility, because the gains from risk protec-
tion are the product of the truncated price distributions, not lower realized prices.
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Then, one would simulate the model for all individuals under their observed insurance plan,
while assuming a premium of zero and that the medical care consumption path for each
individual mimics the path under the no insurance condition. This assumption is necessary
if the utility differences due to insurance are to be caused by changes in risk protection only.
Otherwise, consumption would increase with insurance, as it decreases the price of care.
One can then compare utility with and without insurance, where utility is calculated as the
sum of expected utilities in each month. (Expected utility is calculated at observed choices
by integrating over the price distributions.) Finally, the welfare gain from risk protection is
calculated as the willingness-to-pay for insurance protection, which can be thought of as the
premium that would cause utility when insured to be equal to utility when uninsured.
D.1.2 Welfare Losses from Moral Hazard
When individuals become insured, the price of medical care falls and consumption of
medical care increases. In the empirical health economics literature, the change in annual
expenditure resulting from this increase in consumption is often referred to as moral hazard.
Assuming consumption without insurance (i.e., when individuals pay the full price of care)
is socially optimal, this additional consumption generates a welfare loss. However, the entire
increase in expenditure is not representative of a welfare loss. As is covered extensively by
Nyman (1999a,b,c), the increase in consumption is the result of both lower prices and an
income transfer from the well to the sick, the latter of which is welfare neutral. The point is
made clear in the following example:
“Assume a large population of 10,000 consumers, each with identical prefer-
ences and incomes of US$40,000. The probability that each consumer will be-
come ill is 1/10. ... With insurance that pays off by reducing the price from US$1
per unit of medical care to US$0 per unit, each ill consumer who is insured con-
sumes US$20,000 worth of medical care (20,000 units) after paying a US$2000
premium. ... Of this US$20,000, US$2000 represents the ill consumer’s con-
tribution to the insurance pool and US$18,000 represents income transfers from
those who remain healthy. ... As a result, the ill consumer now is consuming a
total of US$58,000 worth of both medical care and other consumption, but had
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only US$40,000 to spend without insurance. The only way that this person can
spend US$58,000 with an original budget of US$40,000 is because of a transfer
of US$18,000 in income from those nine (out of every 10 consumers) who re-
main healthy. ... The increased spending on health care that occurs as a result of
this income transfer should be excluded from the welfare calculations, as is typi-
cally done with income transfers, because the gain to one individual (US$18,000
in this case) equals the loss to others (US$2000 by each of the nine other con-
sumers). Only that portion of medical care spending that remains and that is due
to a pure price effect has welfare implications.” Nyman (1999a)
Of the papers mentioned in Section D.1, all but Kowalski (2013) calculate the welfare
losses from moral hazard including the income transfer. Using the model presented in this
dissertation, one can calculate these welfare losses both with (for comparison purposes) and
without medical care consumption due to income transfers. The simulation is best understood
with reference to Figure D.1. In the figure, a representative individual uses his income, Y ,
to consume medical care, M , and a composite good, X . Without insurance, each good is
priced such that the slope of the budget constraint BC1 reflects the relative price per unit.
His preferences are described by indifference curve IC1, so that when ill and uninsured he
consumes A units of medical care (when well he does not consume any medical care). He
is offered an insurance plan defined by premium P , deductible D1, co-insurance rate a ∈
(0, 1), and stop loss D2.105 When insured and ill, the individual’s preferences dictate that he
consumes B units of medical care. According do the above definition, moral hazard is then
calculated as the difference between A and B, where part of the spending increase is due to
the price decrease (substitution effect) and part is due to income transfers (income effect). To
calculate the welfare loss from moral hazard, these two effects must be separated.
To determine the increase is consumption due to the price change only, the income advan-
tage of the insured must be removed. One can do so by shifting the insured budget constraint
105The cost-sharing structure of this health insurance plan is standard in todays market. Individuals cover the
full cost of care up to some level called the deductible (D1). After crossing the deductible, they are responsible
for only a portion of the cost of care. For simplicity, I assume this portion is determined by a co-insurance
rate (a, a percentage of the cost), rather than a co-pay level (a fixed number of dollars). If accumulated out-of-
pocket expenditure over the insurance year eventually reaches the stop loss (D2), then all medical care has zero
out-of-pocket cost for the remainder of the year.
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Figure D.1: Income and Substitution Effects
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down to BC3 so that it is binding at medical care consumption level A, optimal consumption
when uninsured.106 Optimal medical care consumption at BC3, the income neutral budget
constraint, is C. Thus, C minus A measures the increase in medical care consumption due to
a fall in prices, while B minus C measures the increase due to income transfers. The welfare
loss from this additional consumption (C minus A) can then be calculated as the total expen-
diture on medical care at consumption level C minus an individuals willingness to pay for the
consumption level. (At A, total expenditure equals willingness to pay.)
In order to calculate this difference for an individual i, one would first determine medical
care consumption level A for each individual by simulating the model under no insurance.
106The vertical shift from BC2 to BC3 reflects the additional amount of composite consumption enjoyed by
an uninsured individual, consuming at A, after he becomes insured. This additional composite consumption
reflects added wealth from insurance.
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Then, the increase in composite consumption with insurance, CC, assuming no moral hazard
(graphically, this is the vertical distance betweenBC2 andBC3) can be calculated by simulat-
ing the model for all individuals under their observed insurance plan, while holding medical
care consumption fixed. After calculating CC one can simulate the model for all individuals
under their observed insurance plan assuming (1) the plan premium is P + CC, so that their
budget constraint in this step reflects that of BC3, and (2) individuals choose medical care
optimally. This simulation generates medical care consumption level C for each individual,
as well as the corresponding total expenditure calculation needed for the welfare calculation.
Finally, one can calculate individual willingness to pay for the consumption stream C and
compare it to total expenditure.
D.2 The Welfare Implications of Limited Insurance Choice
The United States is unique among developed countries in its lack of public health insur-
ance coverage for non-elderly citizens.107 Most (62%) non-elderly Americans carry private
health insurance coverage. Also, U.S. tax law encourages employers to select and subsidize
a set of plans for their employees to choose from.108 The result of this law is that 56% of
the non-elderly population carries a health insurance plan from an alternative set selected and
subsidized by their employer.109
Unfortunately, many employers offer a very limited set of health insurance alternatives,
if they offer a choice at all. According to the 2013 Employer Health Benefits Survey, 87%
of the U.S. employers who offer health insurance offer only one type of plan and 12% offer
107According to OECD Health Data, only 26.4% of the U.S. population in 2009 held public health insurance
coverage; the lowest among OECD countries. Chile had the second lowest level of public coverage at 73.5%.
Of the 30 member nations, 25 extend public health insurance coverage to over 95% of their citizens.
108U.S. tax law allows employers to offer a set of insurance plans in which they pay all or a portion of their
employee’s insurance premiums with dollars that are not subject to the federal income tax. As a result, em-
ployees prefer to acquire health insurance through their employer, rather than on the private market where they
would have to pay premiums with after (federal income) tax dollars.
109The remaining non-elderly population is either uninsured (18%), has Medicaid coverage (18%), or gets
coverage through some other public source (3%, Current Population Survey 2013).
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two alternatives.110 In the estimation sample, 42% of individuals are limited to one plan, 18%
have access to two plans, and 13% select from three plans. And while there is much debate
in popular media on the current health insurance environment in the U.S., little attention
has been given to the welfare implications of these limited alternative sets. Furthermore,
Dafny, Ho, and Varela (2013) are the only scholars to study these welfare effects in the health
economics literature.
I am able to examine the welfare implications of the limited health insurance alterna-
tive sets observed in the estimation sample by calculating individuals’ willingness to pay for
counterfactual health insurance plans. I focus the analysis on adding two particular plans, in
separate simulations, in order to determine if the limited alternative set generally results in
over or under insurance. First, I add a high deductible (HD) health insurance plan to every
individuals’ alternative set. The HD plan has a $1000 deductible and no cost-sharing after the
deductible is met, which is consistent with the HD plans observed in the data. Second, I add
a comprehensive plan (i.e., individuals pay nothing out-of-pocket for care) to every individu-
als’ alternative set. For each of these plans, the total premium charged and the proportion of
that premium that individuals must pay out-of-pocket determines the rate at which the plans
are selected. Therefore, I vary insurance premiums and employer contributions across simu-
lations. The HD plan provides little coverage for insured individuals, so the total premiums
tested are taken from the left tail of the total premium distribution in the data. (I use the
minimum observed premium and premiums at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% percentiles.) Con-
versely, the comprehensive plan provides full coverage for insured individuals, so the total
premiums tested are taken from the right tail of the total premium distribution in the data.
(I use premiums at the 80%, 90%, 95%, and 99% percentiles and the maximum premium
observed in the data.) For each plan-premium pair, I simulate behavior assuming both that
110Equal proportions of employees are not limited to these alternative sets as small firms are more likely to
offer small alternative sets. Because more individuals work for large firms than small firms, 49% of all covered
employees are limited to one type of plan, 36% to two types of plans, and 16% to three of more types of plans.
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individuals receive no premium assistance from their employer and that their employer con-
tributes the average amount they are observed to contribute in the data (i.e., if employer A
contributes $500 a year to plan 1 and $700 a year to plan 2, then they contribute $600 a year
to the new plan).
The results of these simulations can be seen in Table D.1. For each simulation, I report
the percentage of the population that remains uninsured, the percentage of the population
that selects the new plan, and the average (consumer) welfare gain in the population due to
the new plans inclusion. Prior to adding the new plan, 9.7% of the population chose to be
uninsured. Added consumer welfare for individuals who do not select the new plan is zero.
For individuals who select the new plan, welfare is calculated as the individual’s willingness
to pay for the new plan minus their out-of-pocket payment. The welfare gain is then averaged
across the population.
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Table D.1: Individual Response to Additional Plans
No Employer Contribution Average Employer Contribution
Total
Premium
Precent
Uninsured
New Plan
Take-up
Average
Welfare Gain
Precent
Uninsured
New Plan
Take-up
Average
Welfare Gain
High Deductible Plan Added
$29 (min) 6.1% 20.3% $221 6.0% 21.0% $228
$800 (1%) 8.4% 9.2% $115 6.2% 20.4% $222
$1395 (5%) 8.8% 5.3% $73 6.7% 18.4% $204
$1536 (10%) 9.1% 4.8% $66 6.8% 17.6% $197
$1716 (20%) 9.2% 4.1% $58 7.3% 16.2% $185
Comprehensive (No Cost-Sharing) Plan Added
$2496 (80%) 8.7% 9.6% $177 6.0% 32.6% $503
$2988 (90%) 9.0% 7.0% $137 7.1% 23.9% $381
$3456 (95%) 9.2% 5.2% $107 7.9% 17.6% $294
$4587 (99%) 9.4% 2.7% $64 8.8% 8.8% $162
$10188 (max) 9.6% 0.0% $11 9.6% 0.0% $17
† The table contains four quadrants. The top left quadrant represents measured responses to the addition of a high deductible (HD) plan
to all individuals’ insurance alternative sets when employers pay no part of the premium; in the top right employers make the average
contributions they are observed to make in the data. The bottom two quadrants measure responses to the addition of a comprehensive
plan rather than an HD plan. Interpretation of the table elements can be understood by considering the first three entires (6.1%, 20.3%,
$221). If an HD plan is added to each individuals’ alternative set, the plan carries a total premium of $29, and employers pay none of this
premium, then (1) the percentage of the population that is uninsured falls from 9.7% to 6.1%; (2) 20.3% of the total population selects the
HD plan over their other alternatives; (3) the average welfare gain in the population is $221 per person.
‡ The information in parenthesis in the far left column represents the percentile of the observed total premium distribution from which
the corresponding premium was taken. For example: $3456 is the 95th percentile of the observed total premium distribution. Also, for
both insurance selection and welfare purposes, the minimum out-of-pocket premium that an individual faces is zero. For example: If the
total annual HD premium is $29 and his employer contributes $1000 on average to insurance premiums, then the out-of-pocket premium
used in analysis (when the employer contributes) is $0.
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There are several patterns in Table D.1. First, when employers contribute to premiums
plans are effectively cheaper for individuals, so the uninsured rate falls, take-up of the new
plan increases, and the average welfare gain increases. Second, the total premium charged
for the new plans is an important determinate of individual responses. For each plan and em-
ployer contribution arrangement, as the total premium increases the percentage of uninsured
individuals increases, take-up decreases, and average welfare gain falls. Note also that ex-
ploring the inadequacy of the observed alternative sets also requires one to know more about
what constitutes a reasonable price for the new plans. Certainly if full coverage is offered
at a low premium, then many individuals will choose it, but this does not provide convinc-
ing evidence that individuals are underinsured at present. Only when an appropriate price is
charged for the new plans can this be determined.
Consider the following: Let us assume that the new plans represent potential public in-
surance options that would be offered by the federal government with the same tax privileges
as employer provided plans. For each of these plans, there is some total premium that the
government would charge to generate zero profits. Assume that the government would break
even with a premium at the 10th percentile of observed premiums ($1536) for the HD plan
and at the 90th percentile ($2988) for comprehensive coverage. If employers contributed to
employee premiums at their current level, then 17.6% of the population would take-up the
HD plan if it alone were offered and 23.9% would take up comprehensive coverage if it were
offered instead. Furthermore, the average welfare gain generated by offering comprehensive
coverage outweighs that generated by offering the HD plan. Both of these findings would
suggest that the more significant effect of limited insurance alternative sets is underinsur-
ance, rather than overinsurance. However, it is also the case that the proportion of uninsured
individuals is reduced more by offering the HD plan than the comprehensive plan. So while
the insured population may desire more comprehensive coverage, the uninsured population is
in greater need of affordable, low generosity coverage.
In order to use this model for reliable policy analysis; such as determining the optimal
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public option to offer, more attention must be paid to equilibrium effects in the supply of both
insurance and medical care. The above conclusions are only as reliable as the assumptions
made on what premiums would be charged for the new plans. If comprehensive coverage
requires a premium at the 99th percentile, rather than the 90th, then the result changes entirely.
Also, this analysis ignores the equilibrium effects that shifts in insurance demand have on
premiums. For example, the inclusion of an HD plan to all alternative sets could cause many
low risk individuals to switch from a generous plan to the HD plan. The removal of low risk
individual from the generous plan’s risk pool is likely to cause premiums for the generous plan
to rise, which in turn could cause more individuals to leave the pool. Furthermore, significant
changes in the insurance status of the U.S. population will lead to changes in consumption
patterns (moral hazard), which ultimately impacts the prices charged for medical care. In
order to make reliable policy predictions, these changes in premiums and medical care prices
should be considered.
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